Be it hereby resolved that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:

North Atlantic Council
(NAC I/A - Task ESC)
1. **Tasks** the Committee on Emerging Security Challenges with development of a unified cyber security policy framework for the Alliance, including stipulations for:
   a. Development of an actionable plan for improving cyber defense across member states,
   b. Interoperability between NATO states,
   c. Shared offensive capabilities,
   d. Defining qualifications for a cyber attack warranting a response by Article V, as well as cyber deterrence,
   e. Cooperation between private entities and governments to develop cyber security across all industries,
   f. Developing concerted efforts to leverage the Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CyOc), located in Tallinn, Estonia, as a capacity building home-base to assist Member States in developing their cyber defense and internal security structures,
   g. Further using the CyOc as a resource to assist Member States in meeting their Cyber Defence Pledges, as drafted in 2016, to enhance their cyber defenses,
   h. Improving the response capabilities of the NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams for quicker provisions of assistance in response and recovery in aftermath of cyber attacks, and
   i. Improving situational awareness, utilizing the new Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOc) in Mons, Belgium, as part of NATO’s strengthened Command Structure, operational starting from 2023;

2. **Requests** that the Committee on Emerging Security Challenges prioritizes this task over other agenda items and points of discussion;
3. **Necessitates** that this product is created by the Committee On Emerging Security Challenges by the end of debate on 15 February 2019.

(NAC I/B - Task POL)

4. **Tasks** the Political Committee with the discussion of the topic ‘the future of NATO’s mandate in Afghanistan;

5. **Recommends** the following considerations to be discussed within the purview of this topic:
   a. Promote cooperation between NATO forces and Afghanistan Security Forces, primarily with Alliance forces serving in a train/equip role to work towards self-sustainment for a stable Afghan government with an emphasis on eventual withdrawal of all NATO forces from the region,
   b. The prioritization of ongoing diplomatic efforts to empower and enable local powers, specifically the Afghan government, to promote long-term stability and security nationwide,
   c. Increased use of NATO’s Hub for the South in order to promote solidarity and intelligence sharing regarding NATO’s role in Afghanistan,
   d. The contributions of willing and able NATO member states with their own respective capabilities and skills, and
   e. The continuation of multilateral diplomatic discussion between the Taliban, Afghan Government, and other relevant parties;

6. **Mandates** that the Afghanistan topic takes priority over Political Committee’s existing agenda items, as requested by the Secretary General;

7. **Further tasks** the Political Committee with establishing the framework for a joint NATO conditioned statement to restore normal relations with the Russian Federation to ensure their accountability and adherence to international rules-based order, under the purview of their agenda topic ‘Resetting the Relationship with Russia’ at whatever point this is discussed bearing in mind the security and sovereignty of member states when faced with Russian threats.

(NAC I/C)

8. **Emphasizes** the pressing task of the Alliance on establishing a unified 360° approach on NATO policy that highlights the importance of addressing all threats against NATO’s Eastern, Western, Southern and Northern dimensions, and shall:
   a. Promote operational capabilities to defend against potentially destabilizing hybrid threats,
b. Improve efficiency of resource use and response in the Baltics to ensure stability in the region, and
c. Extend response capabilities to the High North;

9. **Further emphasizes** the need for the Alliance to continue engaging in dialogue and diplomacy with the Russian Federation as part of the focus on NATO’s East and High North, noting that:
   a. A more predictable rhythm of NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meetings, by setting a firm timetable with a specified number of regular meetings, with additional emergency meetings scheduled as needed,
   b. Member States of the Alliance will continue to convene with Russian representatives in the meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), occurring on a basis of multiple times per year, to promote friendly relations, and
   c. The Alliance will not, by any means, compromise on the security and sovereignty of its Member States in exchange for concessions by the Russian Federation, seeing as the collective defense of all allies is a core principle of the Alliance;

10. **Further addresses** the focus on NATO’s East by working to increase the number of allies in support for NATO continuing and expanding member state contributions to Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, especially by calling upon Allies not involved in these battle groups to commit troops to them;

11. **Calls for** increases in the rapid response capabilities of the NATO Response Forces (NRF) in order to respond to increasing threats on Member States more swiftly and decisively, by:
   a. Promoting increased readiness of the Initial Follow-On Forces Group through joint exercises focusing on deployment and the rapid establishment of logistical support,
   b. Re-evaluating the operational needs of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), with special regards to the size, equipment, and intelligence support available,
   c. Tasking the NRF with evaluation of their ability to contribute to non-combat operations such as natural disaster relief and domestic peacekeeping in times of crisis;

12. **Calls upon** the significance of the High North flank for the security of the alliance, while:
a. Remaining conscious of the position of the majority of Russia’s navy and nuclear capabilities in NATO’s High North sphere, and monitors and surveils the increased Russian military activity and capability building in the region, and
b. Emphasising the necessity of preparing the Alliance for future security threats in the region, by conducting military exercises in the mountainous and snowy terrain of the High North such as the recent Trident Juncture 18 exercise;

13. **Further Addresses** NATO’s role in stability operations in the Western Balkans by promoting,
   a. Stability in the region through continued support to KFOR and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
   b. Incorporation of new member states in the region expanding the scope of NATO and facilitating cooperation,
   c. Increasing political dialogue and practical cooperation among partners in the region creating stability, investment, and prosperity;

14. **Calls upon** the Supreme Allied Commander - Transformation (SAC-T) to complete a review of Alliance strategy on NATO’s South, including Iraq, Afghanistan, and counter-terrorism, in the agenda of the 2019 Summit, with the goals of:
   a. Strengthening posture, deterrence, and collective defense in NATO’s South,
   b. Incorporating NATO’s Hub for the South in efficient intelligence sharing between member states and southern partners,
   c. Limiting and controlling the flow of migration from Africa into Europe, and
   d. Addressing other needs of NATO South as determined by the Military Committee and Emerging Security Committee;

15. **Recommends** the creation of a holistic defense against non-state actors, in particular in order to secure the Alliance’s Southern border, by:
   a. Utilizing the Defense Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence (DATCoE) in Ankara, Turkey in order to develop a counter-terrorism strategy that improves the Alliance’s capabilities and interoperability,
   b. Collaborating with the Global Coalition to Fight ISIL,
   c. Securing the Mediterranean and Black Seas via increased air policing,
   d. Building upon the Package for the South in increasing utilization of the NATO-Kuwait ICI Regional Center to full capability, and

16. **Exhorts** European countries to cooperate in order to:
a. Promote the coordination of the political and budget structures of the European countries by utilizing financial entities and funds such as, but not limited, to the European Defense Fund,

b. Promote cross-organizational cooperation between the European Union and NATO, increase the interoperability between European armed forces and NATO,

c. Promote voluntary sharing of intel between the European countries and NATO, including on areas such as cybersecurity and hybrid threats,

d. Harmonize intelligence sharing both within the Alliance and with the EU, contingent on discussions with the EU regarding the importance of including non-NATO EU members and non-EU NATO members, and

e. Promote the development of multi-governmental-led spatial program between European countries and NATO members, in order to assure and increase border control, security issues, observation and communication;

17. **Expands** the Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CDCoE) for the purpose of securing cybersecurity in the Eastern European borderer, through effort from the countries of:
   a. France, providing training, infrastructure and funding,
   b. Italy, providing training, infrastructure, and personnel,
   c. Estonia, providing research, infrastructure, and personnel,
   d. Lithuania, providing funding to expand research into offensive cyber capabilities,
   e. Latvia, providing funding towards defensive cyber capabilities,
   f. Luxembourg, providing training, infrastructure, and funding, and
   g. Netherlands, providing infrastructure and funding.

(NAC I/D)

18. **Establishes** the strategic objectives of NATO regarding energy security policy as follows:
   a. Promoting the use of renewable energy produced by NATO member states and enhancing the abilities of member states to coordinate efforts to enhance overall energy capabilities, with emphasis on a 360 degree approach,
   b. Fostering a stable transition away from fossil and non-renewable energy sources towards sustainable, environmentally-conscious energy production,
   c. Ensuring that NATO members and NATO partners are able to establish energy security effectively and without compromising other strategic NATO objectives,
   d. Providing forums and existing relationships for energy-related partnerships to draw upon, utilize, and grow from, and
   e. Establishing concrete short-term and long-term plans in order to meet the aforementioned goals and align with the common goal of striving for energy independence amongst member states;
19. **Recommends** that, in accordance to paragraphs 78 in the Brussels Declaration and 135 of the Warsaw Declaration, member states further develop a structural framework in order to improve energy efficiency and utilization of alternative renewable resources through entities such as but not limited to:
   a. International Atomic Energy Agency
   b. The International Energy Agency, and
   c. The European Union;

20. **Creates** an energy security summit to be held in Bratislava, Slovakia on June 27, 2020, which will,
   a. Exchange ideas between partner countries regarding solutions to energy dependence on non-member states,
   b. Address concerns among NATO members and NATO partner states about moving towards renewable energy,
   c. Develop a strategy regarding the reduction of energy reliance on condemned non-member states,
   d. Commit to drafting a treaty between member states which will:
      i. Establish an energy sharing initiative among member states in the event of future non-member based energy source tampering, and
      ii. Be among member states which have submitted an energy action plan, and
   e. Be funded by willing and able member states;

21. **Requests** the Energy Security Center of Excellence in Lithuania research and develop a plan for bolstering the security of Alliance energy transports and reserves to be submitted at the Bratislava summit;

22. **Invites** each NATO member-state to submit an actionable plan, to be submitted to the Alliance by 2021 and completed by the 2030 Clean and Renewable Energy Initiative, for the purpose of diversifying their energy imports and production that will include:
   a. A focus on diversification of energy suppliers and types, placing emphasis on plans to increase utilization of renewable energy,
   b. Attempts to move away from reliance by member states on any countries condemned by the Alliance,
   c. Efforts to provide resources to develop and strengthen energy infrastructure, bearing in mind countries interests and needs,
   d. Assistance on nuclear energy development programs, training, and other resources from willing countries such as France, and
e. Support for member countries lacking infrastructure to preserve their energy security; and

23. **Encourages** member states to begin research into moving towards reliance on renewable energy by consciously realizing that renewable energy is sustainable for a country’s sovereignty and security as well as the future of the planet.

(NAC II/A)

24. **Recommends** the development of energy independence, especially in the Baltic countries, in order to further facilitate interdependence and cooperation within the Alliance through:
   a. European Union cooperation, such as that through the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP),
   b. Defending energy transportation sources, such as the Balticconnector pipeline and the planned GIPL pipeline between Poland and Lithuania, through development of energy protection plans at the Lithuanian Energy Security Center of Excellence,
   c. Diversifying the energy production infrastructure within the Baltic countries through the construction and use of an intercontinental pipeline in order to facilitate the energy needs of the Eastern Flank, and
   d. Development of renewable sources of energy production in the long-term as a means of domestic energy diversification;

25. **Reaffirms** the commitment by all member states to meet the provisions outlined in Article 14 of the 2014 Wales Summit, specifically:
   a. The NATO guideline for the member states to spend at minimum 2% of their overall Gross Domestic Product on defense, and
   b. The sub-guideline to spend 20% of the aforementioned 2% defense budget on major equipment, including research and development (R&D);

26. **Calls upon** Member States to expand their focus beyond simply viewing the 2% guideline as an end goal, but rather to focus on actionable defense outcomes via which Member States can contribute to the strategic goals of the Alliance, including, but not limited to:
   a. Further commitments to strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence posture in the East through its Enhanced Forward Presence,
   b. Increased training of personnel for the purposes of increased cyber defense capabilities across Member States, and
c. Any other defense outcomes that Member States see fit for their individual and collective defense goals;

27. **Invites** Member States to spend 15% of their defence expenditure on joint training and readiness in order to close the capabilities gap and promote commitment to reach the 2% guideline;

28. **Requests** that NATO establishes a Defense Spending Evaluations Center of Excellence (DSECoE) in Portugal with the purpose of:
   a. Increasing the compatibility of Allied troops through standardization of logistical procedures, to include but not limited to equipment requests, sustainment protocols, and non-combat resource sharing,
   b. Installing credible monitoring and transparency of the 20% equipment expenditure in determining the level of modernization of NATO members’ capabilities,
   c. Enhancing the resilience of the Alliance in the future by determining the most efficient use of existing financial resources, and
   d. Enhancing the resilience of the Alliance in the future Evaluating critical areas where modernization of forces and equipment will yield the highest impacts on accomplishing NATO defense outcomes;

29. **Requests** that all NATO member states continue to submit an annual Defense Spending Pledge Report detailing:
   a. Reasonable, realistic, and actionable domestic plans to increase defense spending to meet the goals outlined during the 2014 Wales Summit,
   b. Evaluations as to whether the 2% spending goal will substantially increase the defense capabilities of the individual states, as well as the Alliance, and
   c. Propositions for ongoing adjustments to NATO defense spending guidelines moving forward;

30. **Asserts** that collective defense and security must be the priorities of the alliance, and that increased access to financial, military, and other resources is essential to the future achievement of our security objectives;

31. **Suggests** that Alliance states continue to contribute in equipment, troops, and other resources as well as funding, including:
   a. Modern and sophisticated military equipment,
   b. Continued collective research and development of new and continued improvements of capabilities,
c. The fostering of cooperative research and defense initiatives to maximize resource utilization, and
d. Important intelligence, political, and diplomatic resources to support combat and security operations;

32. **Recommends** that the Alliance states set goals beyond the agreements set in the 2014 Wales Summit, such that:
   a. The progress made by increased defense spending is not reversed by decreases after 2024,
   b. Reevaluations of existing financial goals given current threat analyses every five (5) years following 2024, with the first reevaluation to take place in 2029, and
   c. The 2% GDP Defense Spending goal remains a standard until further alliance decisions specifically render it not so;

33. **Proposes** to expand the scope of the 2% GDP Defense Spending target by including:
   a. Non-military investments on air, land, sea and cyber infrastructures,
   b. Clear guidelines regarding the eligibility of said infrastructures, such as standardization of railway gauges and bridge reinforcement, to count towards the 2% be established by the DSECoE,
   c. Humanitarian efforts as part of NATO’s disaster relief operations,
   d. Deployment of troops, equipment and other resources to NATO missions, and
   e. Recognition of the unique specializations of each member country; and

34. **Calls upon** the International Board of Auditors (IBAN), in collaboration with NATO’s Financial Controller to continue overseeing progress in meeting the Wales Summit Guidelines.

**Political Affairs Committee**

(POL I/A)

35. **Recommends** the creation of an ad hoc committee of experts chosen by the Political Affairs Committee that will:
   a. Form a list of standards that, if met by Russia, will allow the Russian Chief of General Staff to meet with the chairman of the NATO military committee as a new means of dialogue,
   b. Consider current NATO-Russia relations and any grievances or issues while creating these standards,
   c. Be completed by June 2020, to be updated in the future if deemed necessary by the Political Committee,
   d. Meet on an annual basis, and
36. **Urges** member states to emphasize and uphold security, including cybersecurity, through methods including:

   a. Inviting member states to follow the model of creating Cyber and Data Embassies, such as that of Estonia which exists currently in Luxembourg, which:
      
      i. Will serve as a backup of the member state’s government documents and information to ensure continuity of the state in the event of a conventional attack, and
      
      ii. Is to be created for able and willing member states, and

   b. Tasking Estonia with the sharing of cyber-security measures implemented in the development of the existing Cyber Embassy with all participating member states;

37. **Requests** the assistance of the Military Committee and Defence Councilors of NATO member states in the bolstering and consistency of Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) exercises, noting that:

   a. Exercises of EFP forces should be conducted on a regular basis as deemed by the host and contributing member states,

   b. The EFP program is to be expanded in the High North to increase deterrence in this area given its growing relevance and be achieved through annual exercises in the High North in accordance to Norwegian and Danish policy regarding the deployment of foreign troops in peacetime,

   c. It is necessary to establish and develop cyber security capabilities through Estonian Cybersecurity Center of Excellence in the interest of mitigating cyber threats;

(POL I/B)

38. **Emphasizes** that in order for NATO allies to have fruitful relations with the Russian Federation, the Russian government must accept the sovereignty of all NATO member states and respect all existing agreements between Russia and the alliance;

39. **Reaffirms** the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration’s call for the Russian Federation to take meaningful steps towards cooperation with NATO by:

   a. Immediately withdrawing troops and equipment from Ukraine and Georgia to demonstrate their respect for the national sovereignty of those states, and

   b. Halting the continuation of protracted hybrid warfare at once on NATO member and partner states;
40. **Analyzes** NATO actions in the Eastern European and Northern European terrain with special emphasis in the regions of the Baltics, Balkans region, and High North by:
   a. Using the framework created by the RAND corporation to assess the reactions of Russia to NATO action in this area with special attention toward:
      i. NATO’s relative overall capabilities,
      ii. NATO’s relative local capabilities,
      iii. Russian perceptions of NATO’s intentions, and
      iv. Russian perceptions of NATO’s willingness to defend its members against aggression,
   b. Utilizing experts selected by the Political Committee:
      i. Beginning the analysis in July 2019, and
      ii. Ending the analysis by July 2020 with the possibility of updating this analysis annually;

41. **Urges** the Russian Federation to increase peaceful, meaningful, and transparent dialogue with NATO and its member and partner states;

42. **Tasks** SACEUR to develop and coordinate strategies among European NATO members that would bolster sovereign airspace security against aggressive entities who seek to violate it;

(POL 1/C)

43. **Affirms** the need for a better quality of dialogue with the Russian Federation to increase predictability and to simultaneously reduce the risks of conflicts resulting from miscommunication, through measures such as, but not limited to:
   a. More channels of communication, through parallel meetings of the Russian Chief of General Staff with the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Air Chief on political and long-term issues, and
   b. Open communication in order to combat the unique threats of the middle east;

44. **Recommends** restraint into conventional deterrence postures, through measures such as, but not limited to:
   a. The affirmation of past mutual restraint measures that would be re-examined and adapted to current situations, including through work on the modernization of the definitions on the size and kinds of forward-deployed forces or reinforcements that would be perceived as destabilizing, and
   b. Encourages the NPG to start discussion on revisiting alternative pledges limiting potential decline of existing nuclear agreements;
45. **Encourages** confidence-building measures in order to encourage a stronger long term relationship between Russia and NATO Member States by cooperation on issues such as, but not limited to:
   a. Securing nuclear materials,
   b. Search and rescue operations in the High North, and
   c. Disaster relief efforts, including oil spills, and

46. **Emphasizes** the need to mutually reinforce other formats of contacts such as, but not limited to:
   a. Processes of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), as well as on bilateral and multilateral levels, and
   b. Beyond official government level, between individuals, think tanks and academic experts.

**Military Affairs Committee**

(MIL I/A)

47. **Urges** the promotion of cooperation between NATO forces and Afghanistan Security forces through:
   a. The bolstering of training missions between NATO forces and the Afghanistan National Security Council in regions such as Bagram, Helmand, Mazar-e Sharif and Kandahar, and
   b. The increased modernization of military training techniques of the Afghan National Security Forces as well as the strengthening of the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership in order to effectively improve the Afghan Forces so that their government is able to function independently of international intervention;

48. **Requests** the evaluation and assessment of the effectiveness of Operation Resolute Support by SACEUR, following commitments made at the Brussels Summit in 2018, with the goal that:
   a. This assessment will take place from the passage of this document until January of 2022,
   b. If deemed effective there will be a further reduction of NATO forces under the current joint operation, and
   c. If deemed ineffective, adapting the ORS by willing and able member states by recommendation of SACEUR until it can be improved, and forces are evaluated at a level deemed suitable to the allies;

49. **Seeks** to bolster the security of allies in Afghanistan through:
a. Maintaining efforts to foster stability in Afghanistan and leave room for future negotiations with NATO recognized forms of Afghanistan representation in the future, and

b. Work with related non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan to help ensure their security;

50. **Utilizes** the NATO Hub for the South to better predict and prevent instability and advise Afghanistan at its discretion through promoting the efficiency of ORS by:
   a. Connecting allies, partners, civil society, and subject matter experts,
   b. Training willing and able Afghan governmental bodies in intelligence storing and sharing,
   c. Supporting the Afghan government by aiding in healthcare and education in order to promote stabilization, and
   d. Involvement of Norway and willing and able NATO members in offering advisory and negotiations mentors to help shape the dialogue of negotiations for peace;

51. **Further invites** NATO members to maintain their individual contributions to the effort in Afghanistan, as long as they are willing and able, including but not limited to:
   a. Utilizing the geographical position and facilities of Turkey, especially the Partnership for Peace facility already in place, with the possible addition of a dedicated troop training facility,
   b. Employing the political training officers and funding of France, specifically through the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (D.E.E.P.), and support capabilities of Italy,
   c. Deploying canine units trained by Latvia to collaborate in peacekeeping and countering drug smuggling in the country,
   d. Continuing support and financial aid for the NATO-run Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund re-evaluating the necessity of this fund by 2022,
   e. Encouraging NATO to take a “together in, and together out” approach to this matter when considering eventual withdrawal, and
   f. Further utilizing the Center of Excellence in Cyber Security, located in Estonia, to combat cyber attacks and misinformation campaigns originating from Afghanistan;

52. **Encourages** multilateral diplomatic discussions between Afghan political actors including, but not limited to the Afghan government, the Taliban, and members of civil society through NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative, who will:
   a. Organize peaceful missions sent by NATO defined relevant political actors, and
b. Moderate such meetings;

53. **Supports** the government of Afghanistan in the enforcement of all legal, constitutional, and political measures as determined by the Political Affairs Committee by offering to:
   a. Implement NATO an assessment that evaluates the multidimensional functions of the Afghanistan parliament and how each component influences the country’s sovereignty, and
   b. Provide resources, mediums and or personnel necessary to ensure that governmental structure is being operated at its most efficient capacity while keeping the interests of the Afghanistan parliament and its civilians at the forefront; with the overarching desire to conduct proper procedures.

(MIL II/A)

54. **Defines** a cyber attack as any action or operation conducted by a state or non-state actor by use of cyber technology, with the intent of disrupting, destroying or incapacitating the targets, be it a state or non-state actor, security, daily operations, future operations, equipment or its population, and provided that the aforementioned operation or action succeeds in doing so. Any cyber attacks will be treated equivalent to the harm as caused by other methods warfare as defined in Article IV and Article V;

55. **Tasks** the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CyOc) with setting up a Joint Cyber Task Force to investigate cyber attacks on Member States’ governments and public service infrastructure, that will:
   a. Present their findings to the Military Council in order to reach decisions regarding the invocation of Article V,
   b. Cooperate with Interpol, the European Union, Europol, and any other relevant international bodies,
   c. Collaborate with the European Union’s Network and Information Security directives to ensure develop better national capabilities and perform cyber exercises,
   d. Be composed of current CyOc personnel,
   e. Consider use of the 1999 Schmitt Analysis method in order to assess qualifications for cyber attacks and their relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Articles IV and V, and
   f. Respect that in the occasion of the question of Article V being invoked, the final decision will rest with the aggrieved country and if Article V is not invoked, the option of escalation to offensive action is open to the offended member state;

56. **Calls for** the CyOc to produce updates to the *Tallinn Manual* every year to establish how developments in international law ought to be adapted to the realm of cyber conflict;
57. **Recommends** that all countries work toward a minimum standard of Cyber Defense infrastructure as advised by the CyOc in Estonia and commit to:
   a. Having all standards be met by 2025 from the Cyber Defence Pledges as drafted in 2016,
   b. Revisiting the minimum standards every two years to revise as needed,
   c. Improving security measures as recommended by the Cyber Defence Center of Excellence on a continuous basis,
   d. Emphasizing the need for these standards to be met in a timely manner while recognizing that member states have different needs,
   e. Encouraging cooperation between countries for greater adherence to minimum cyber defense standards,
   f. Reiterating the coordination between countries who are falling behind their cyber defence targets and both other Member States and the CyOc, and
   g. Ensuring interoperability in cybersecurity affairs matching that of other NATO military capabilities;

58. **Increases Cooperation** between the Military Committee, CyOc and the Cyber Security Collaboration to assess each member states cyber strengths and concerns in order to formulate a comprehensive NATO cyber strategy by review of adherence to standards recommended by the CyOc Task Force and the Cyber Security Collaboration every five years by:
   a. Addressing infrastructure, enforcement, defensive and offensive capabilities, research, and development in the cyber world,
   b. Emphasizing the usage of the Cyber Security Cooperation Hub and Cyberspace Operations Centre in order to address remedial states that may not be meeting the required benchmarks, and
   c. Calling for high-quality national research and development in the field of digital information and cyber security;

59. **Invites** NATO members to implement the following cyber-procedures on a government-wide level, with the support of the CyOc and other NATO resources and will:
   a. Encourage the creation and practice of necessary backup procedures in the process of mass cyber attacks:
      i. Including procedures to secure vulnerable and important individuals, financial systems, telecommunications, transportation, energy network, water supply and distribution,
ii. Encouraging the utilization of the resources of the Energy Security Centre of Excellence present in Lithuania to focus on defense of cyber attacks against energy infrastructure in conjunction with other assets in the alliance,

iii. Including regular procedural drills with member states to prepare for mass cyber attacks from both state and nonstate actors, and

iv. Incorporating the inclusion of the NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction Team in responses as deemed necessary,

b. Take into account that cyber-defense policies go hand-in-hand with the ‘on-the-ground’ security forces, and

c. Call for a regular status update for sectoral implementations of action plan initiatives, in order to monitor developments in cyber security;

60. **Recommends** the formation of public-private partnerships in the field of information security and cyber-defense by:

   a. Calling for joint or coordinated programmes to train individuals, build awareness, and develop a culture of cyber security,

   b. Calling for input from private enterprises on implementing cyber security policies, and

   c. Encouraging the sharing of information and security strategy between private enterprise and NATO member governments,

   d. Intensifying cooperation with industry through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership, and

   e. Working closely with the European Union.

**Committee on Emerging Security Challenges**

(ESC I/A)

61. **Reiterates** commitment to previous agreements in order to set the framework for a policy for space operations with NATO such as:

   a. Current legal framework on space, including but not limited to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, that forms the basis of international space law, and

   b. Articles IV and V of the North Atlantic Treaty while reasserting their application to all activities in space and on celestial bodies;

62. **Established** in coordination with the Military Committee, to establish a NATO Space Policy which will:

   a. Outline NATO’s goals, operations, and current status on space capabilities in areas such as:
i. Defensive capabilities,
ii. Research and development, and
iii. Maintenance and security of space-based systems,

b. Expand on previous NATO publications on space such as the Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations,
c. Provide a focus on defensive versus offensive space capabilities, and
d. Emphasize international missions of cooperation like the International Space Station and member countries’ satellites for research and surveillance as well as increase international cooperation;

63. **Requests** that the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee engage in dialogue with third-party countries with an emphasis on countries in the NATO Partnership Program with space capabilities with the specifications of:
   a. Including topics in dialogue such as but not limited to:
      i. Space capabilities,
      ii. Space exploration and research, and
      iii. The role of the military in space,
   b. Pledging that the alliance remains open to dialogue with all third-party countries, specifically Russia, China, India, and Japan, and that dialogue be the first reaction to any concerning action in space emanating from third-party countries,
   c. Considering, if dialogue is not amenable to third party states, adapting defense measures are an option for member states,
   d. Ensures that all countries are held accountable for unprovoked and belligerent actions in space,
   e. Noting that the alliance and individual states have the right to retain classified information and that all information is shared on a willing and able basis, and
   f. Remaining transparent about the NATO Space Policy created earlier in this draft that will exhibit to the world NATO strategy and encourage open dialogue;

64. **Endorses** the cooperation between public governments and their space agencies, and private space enterprises while:
   a. Realizing that public-private partnerships can boost the development of emerging space technologies,
   b. Understanding that private space enterprises could be a security concern for NATO in the future,
   c. Recognizing the need for outside funding and the limited funding capabilities of many countries,
   d. Proposing that NATO actively encourages participation in research with private corporations to promote goodwill, and
e. Not limiting the advancement of commercialization in space and enforcing ethical safe exploration; and

65. **Calls upon** the active protection of the space environment by space agencies and the international community for the purpose of protecting NATO’s interests in space by:
   a. Encouraging scientists at space agencies, as well as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, to mindfully consider and research the environmental impact of any and all space operations,
   b. Drawing attention to specific environmental concerns, which may be a consequence of space militarization in the future.

(ESC I/B)

66. **Defines** that NATO Security in Space (NSIS) and weaponization of space have key differences in meaning, noting that the alliance will not pursue at this time any means that fall under the definition of weaponization of space, defining these terms as:
   a. The weaponization of space as referring to the establishment of offensive, first-strike capabilities originating from space used to damage objects in space, in the Earth’s atmosphere, or on Earth or other celestial bodies, including but not limited to space-based missiles, and
   b. NSIS referring to the usage of space for defensive and deterrence capabilities, including but not limited to satellite surveillance and ‘Iron-dome’ technology to shield from attack, excluding placing missile systems in space;

67. **Calls upon** all able and willing Allies to commit to defensive space operations for the entire Alliance by supporting less capable Allies with the assurance that they will be protected under defensive space operations even if they are unable to contribute their own assets;

68. **Recognizes** that defensive operations will protect both space assets and our operations and exercises on the ground by:
   a. The use of space in support of military operations to include Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Satellite Communications (SATCOM), Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), Space Situational Awareness (SSA), and Shared Early Warning (SEW) as needed and,
   b. The utilization of ground-based assets to defend against offensive space capabilities; and

(ESC I/C)
69. **Creates** a NATO Cooperative Space Defense and Research Center of Excellence (CSDRCoE) dedicated to exploration and research of space defense which will be in NATO headquarters, located in Brussels, Belgium, with a centralized research site in the United States with option for expansion:
   a. Focusing on advancements in space technology and information sharing, and training exercises related to defense and deterrence regarding incendiary space activities of other nations,
   b. Encouraging member-wide participation in Space research with increased information sharing, transparency and technological advancements, and
   c. Utilizing the unique capabilities and geographic locations of each member state;

70. **Establishes** the CSDRCoE mandate to achieve:
   a. The development and coordination of space-based defense technologies and policies to provide for the collective security of member states, and
   b. Cooperation in space for policing space debris and the larger space environment in accordance with the UN Peaceful Uses of Outer Space;

71. **Calls** for the coordination of cyber defensive capabilities of all space objects with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CyOc), based in Tallinn, Estonia which will:
   a. Emphasize the development of cybersecurity for existing and future assets in space, including the protection of GPS and Galileo technology, all satellites, and peaceful missions,
   b. Coordinate with the NATO Center of Excellence for Energy Security (CoEES) regarding the physical security of research and for greater coordination, and
   c. Utilize the existing Joint Air and Space Power stations for their resources and helpfulness in researching ground-to-space and space-to-ground missions and operations;

72. **Encourages** cooperation with countries in the NATO partnership program, specifically India and Japan with their existing space capabilities and friendliness toward NATO; and

73. **Asks** willing and able member states to fund the creation of the CSDRCoE and its operations from their existing defense budget contributions to NATO as well as:
   a. Requesting that for expansion, member states present a viable and sustainable funding plan as part of the bidding process, and
   b. Considering in the case of funding falling short of the required amount, recommending that the Center of Excellence reach out to initial partnerships with NATO supported private space-focused corporations and existing educational research centers.
Reaffirming member states’ commitment to international norms as they refer to the rights of refugees, namely the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees:

a. Where there is an understanding that not all migrants qualify for refugee status, and

b. Whereas that migrants that do not qualify for refugee status will have their status determined by the country whose sovereign territory they reside on, and will leave all policy determining the future of the migrants to the domestic institutions;

Leveraging current and developing NATO Partnerships in Europe, South Asia, the Middle East, and northern Africa to promote long-term political stability and economic growth in migrant-exporting countries by:

a. Encouraging Libya and Lebanon to join NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), a regional forum to discuss common security issues,

b. Encouraging Oman to join NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), a regional forum to discuss common security issues,

c. Continuing to work with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates through the ICI, as well as continuing to work with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia through the MD:

i. Aiming to further discussions regarding common border security, human trafficking, criminal syndicates, and terrorism,

ii. Promoting more regular and engaged discussions, with higher-level authority figures, with greater emphasis on a data-based approach, and

iii. Establishing a framework for these nations to share the burden posed on the international community by a surge in global migration,

Nurturing an active partnership between NATO and the African Union to promote economic and regional stability along with active NGOs in the region, and

e. Supporting existing international programs, particularly Frontex and Eurosur, by pledging our military assets to support their respective peaceful missions;

Promoting international cooperation through joint maritime exercises, training centers and operations:

a. Seeking a greater focus on addressing migration at the source, and using naval operations to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea,

b. Including the existing NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMIOTC), and
c. Including commitment to the ongoing European Union (EU) Operation Sophia through NATO’s own Operation Sea Guardian;

77. **Recognizing** the importance of combating the conditions that are conducive to irregular migration and the necessity of promoting stability in at-risk regions from which large groups of people are displaced:
   a. Pledging continued resilience in Mission Resolute Support in Afghanistan which has been a bastion of international cooperation, with coalition members outside of the alliance,
   b. Including the further expansion of these coalitions in order to enhance legitimacy and provide necessary region specific intelligence, and
   c. Utilizing the full capability of the Regional Hub for the South and enhancing NATO’s capacity building efforts, while participating in the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS/Da’esh;

78. **Sharing** intelligence capabilities with NATO members, particularly biometric data that will combat terrorism and human trafficking through non-kinetic means:
   a. Committing to the NATO Intelligence Division that would expedite the sharing of these intelligence capabilities,
   b. Suggesting cooperation and intelligence sharing with the Schengen Information System (SIS),
   c. Keeping in mind that many migrants lack formal identification, and that biometric data may be our best option to ensure accountability, and
   d. Establishing the security procedures to prevent loss of data and sensitive biometric information; and

79. **Encouraging** all NATO Allies that are willing and able to continue supporting the ongoing Peacekeeping Operations and Stabilization Operations as well as pursuing future missions of this nature within their capabilities with the intent of:
   a. Acknowledging that Turkey has offered to host this meeting in Ankara, and
   b. Reducing the need of relocation for potential migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers.

(ESC II/B)

80. **Supports** the creation of a Meeting for EU-NATO Collaboration on European Migration (MENCEM), with the goal of creating a Joint Action Plan on Migration such that it,
   a. Be held from May 17th to May 20th,
   b. Take place in Ankara, Turkey,
   c. Be funded by willing and able member states,
d. Include relevant migration experts from both NATO and EU staff, and
e. Promote closer coordination between humanitarian relief and long-term
development and security;

81. **Suggests** an agenda for MENCEM to include, but not be limited to, the following topics:
   a. Greater communication and transparency in order to promote efficiency in joint
efforts through creating a standing forum for states asking to enhance border
security by sharing best practices,
b. Aiding in the movement of migrants in willing member states through existing
agreements,
c. The establishment of a framework for the vetting of foreign direct investments
(FDI) that may pose as a security threat linked to terrorism, and
d. Efforts to provide political and economic stability to countries that have a high
rate of emigration;

82. **Encourages** collaboration with other relevant international bodies such as:
   a. The UN particularly, the dedication of some member states to the UN Declaration
of Human Rights while additionally recognizing and respecting other member
state’s concerns over sovereignty and security,
b. The International Center for Migration Policy Development, in order to develop
the ICMPD’s and NATO’s knowledge on migration, and
c. Non-EU NATO members including but not limited to Turkey, Canada, and the
United States to ensure a holistic policy; and

83. **Supports** member states with high rates of human trafficking and epidemics in order to
reduce these rates and to uphold international standards for migration:
   a. Utilizing existing NGO’s and EU standards for the safety and security of the
border regions, and
   b. Encouraging the NATO Partnership Committee to encourage participation in
security efforts through NATO from unstable regions.

**Nuclear Planning Group**
(NPG I/A)

84. **Establishes** an initial assessment that will be completed by the Annual NATO Summit of
2020 that will determine weaknesses and vulnerabilities in security, as well as attack
readiness of nuclear weapons facilities by willing members,
a. Collaborating with the governments of the host countries to cooperate in the assessment of the sites at their bases,
b. Tasking the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE) in Vyškov, the Czech Republic to oversee the review of member states’ nuclear weapons facilities security readiness,
c. Tasking the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD-COE) to review the current cybersecurity infrastructure, particularly as it pertains to nuclear weapons facilities operatives, and
d. Allowing future assessment as needed based on the findings in the initial assessment;

85. **Supports** the proper maintenance of nuclear weapons facilities by all willing and able nuclear state members including:
   a. Ensuring security measures that prevent non-state actors or other aggressors from procuring the means to create or distribute dangerous nuclear materials, and
   b. Including the permanent presence of a team of trained officers from the CCD-COE to further report and work to combat potential cyber attacks on individual nuclear weapons facilities;

86. **Recommends** willing members to increase security at research reactors, critical facilities, and pulsed reactors in order to prevent non-state actors from accessing highly enriched uranium (HEU) by way of:
   a. Requiring an increase of physical presence surrounding the aforementioned facilities,
   b. Utilizing the CCD-COE to create a secure network among nuclear powers for information regarding the location of HEU,
   c. Recommending countries create a timeline for the removal of HEU to more secure locations, and
   d. Including an initial assessment by the PCSC of the feasibility and security implications of supporting defense initiatives in NATO partner states, allowing for future decisions to be made based on assessment findings.

(NPG I/B)

87. **Includes** threats that would result in an NPG decision on deployment being implemented such as:
   a. A nuclear threat being directed towards a specific member country or territory either, and
   b. An unwelcome military presence within 100 km of NATO sovereign territory either physically or technologically;
88. **Supports** a limited direct tactical and intermediate response to foreign nuclear action through:
   a. A commitment to no increase weapons previously banned by the INF excluding France, and
   b. Dialogue with Russia as an important component of any large-scale strategic action in Europe to prevent dangerous misunderstanding;

89. **Tasks** the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) to analyze the potential risks at the border before deploying the battery defense system to the Baltic states and to provide a detailed report to the Nuclear Planning Group before any substantive action is taken;

90. **Establishes** THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) battery defense system (U.S. Technology) in Germany and Belgium as deployable in order to provide rapid response to the threat of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) within Europe and Turkey;

91. **Reaffirms** the efforts of all Allies in improving their equipment and contributing more to NATO’s missions and operations:
   a. Considering that the Four Thirties Initiative would enter into force in 2020, and
   b. Adding an additional one to two years for this new clause on Missile Defence;

92. **Calls for** an initial assessment by the PCSC of the feasibility and security implications of supporting defense initiatives in NATO partner states, allowing for future decisions to be made based on assessment findings; and

93. **Addresses** the importance of defending and improving anti-missile defense systems from disruption efforts, including but not limited to organizations such as the Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System by:
   a. Ensuring rigorous cyber-defense for anti-missile defense systems on equal footing with nuclear facility defense, and
   b. Trusting that NATO will focus on GPS-jamming prevention.

**Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee**

(PCS C I/A)

94. **Establishes** the Atlantic-Arab Cooperation Council (AACC) between NATO and the Arab League in order to create a better avenue for discussing critical concerns involving:
a. Migration due to the instability raised by conflict,
b. Enhancing regional security across both organizations,
c. Discussing shared threats between both organizations, such as:
   i. Counter-terrorism efforts,
   ii. Counter-narcotics efforts,
   iii. Human trafficking and the neo-slave trade,
   iv. Counter-improvised explosive devices,
   v. Civil preparedness and crisis management, and
   vi. Cyber defence and the possibility of cyber and space warfare,
   vii. Defence issues and any related security capacity building challenges,
d. Reestablishing a NATO-led operation in support of EU anti-piracy measures, after the end of Operation Ocean Shield, in the regions of:
   i. The African Horn, specifically Somalian shores, and
   ii. The Gulf of Guinea, specifically Nigerian shores.
e. Any further topics proposed by the Arab League;

95. **Decides** that the end result of the dialogue will be the creation of a Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and the Arab League to outline the relations and potential future cooperation;

96. **Creates** the Annual NATO-AU Conference (ANAC) for the purpose of better collaboration with the African Union (AU) which will:
a. Be held in Marseilles, France,
b. Be held in October 2019,
c. Be funded by willing and able member countries, such as the UK,
d. Facilitate dialogue regarding topics previously brought up by the NATO Defense College, such as:
   i. Counter-terrorism,
   ii. Countering improvised explosive devices,
   iii. Cybersecurity,
   iv. The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda,
   v. Supporting AU peace-support operations, and
   vi. Develop humanitarian international law and international human rights according to the UN,
e. Decide that the end result of the dialogue will be the creation of a Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and the Arab League to outline the relations and potential future cooperation
f. Include areas that the AU would like to prioritize,
g. Be continued annually with updated topics based on current issues
i. Migration routes,
ii. Health issues and disease spread,
iii. Extreme weather conditions and natural hazards, such as drought,
iv. Drug trafficking utilizing information from Interpol, UNODC, and the United Nations African Institute for Prevention of Crime and Treatment, and African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control, and
v. Human trafficking; and
vi.

h. Maintain the values of each respective body
i. Recommit to improving the relationship with nations specifically mentioned in the Brussels Summit, especially Tunisia, Jordan, and Libya by
   i. Helping establish political advising programs, and
   ii. Focusing on offering training based NATO Policy on Protection of Civilians, and
j. Re-emphasize that NATO members should explore bilateral economic activities with states of the AU to increase stability;

97. Recommits to improving the relationship with nations specifically mentioned in the Brussels Summit, especially Tunisia, Jordan, and Libya by:
   a. Helping establish political advising programs, and
   b. Focusing on offering training based NATO Policy on Protection of Civilians;

98. Create a bi-annual forum to exchange information on topics including:
   a. Migration routes,
   b. Health issues and disease spread,
   c. Extreme weather conditions and natural hazards, such as drought,
   d. Drug trafficking utilizing information from Interpol, UNODC, and the United Nations African Institute for Prevention of Crime and Treatment, and African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control, and
   e. Human trafficking; and

(PCSC I/D)

99. Re-emphasizes the importance of the utilization of air policing in the Mediterranean to ensure greater security and stability in the region through pre-existing NATO resources such as:
   a. The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Torrejón, Spain,
   b. The Defense Against Terrorism Center of Excellence in Ankara, Turkey, and
   c. Any other relevant centers as recommended by the military committee;
100. **Reaffirms** pre-established relationships with other organizations such as the European Union to work toward fighting shared threats and addressing shared concerns through more opened dialogue;

101. **Continues** to support the EU and UN-led efforts in the Mediterranean Sea such as but not limited to:
   a. Frontex, and
   b. Operation Sophia;

102. **Expands** the Partnership for Peace program to allocate resources to active member countries and offer more opportunities relevant to the interests of the region, specifically member states within the Mediterranean area;

103. **Facilitates** discussions between the Emerging Security Challenges Committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee, and Security Division, and the intelligence fusion centers on the issues pertinent to potential threats;

104. **Creates** an assessment which will:
   a. Be initiated by November 2019 and be completed by November 2020,
   b. Be funded by willing and able NATO member countries,
   c. Analyze the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in regards to:
      i. Contributions to regional security and stability,
      ii. Goals of better mutual understanding,
      iii. Dispelling any misconceptions about NATO among the Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI countries,
      iv. Implementing the principles of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and
      v. Addressing the concerns and interests of the Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI countries, and
   d. Assess the Strategic Hub in Naples in regards to the goals outlined in the Brussels Summit along with other areas of interest, specifically:
      i. Avoiding redundancies,
      ii. Effectiveness in its efforts,
      iii. The ability to contribute to NATO’s situational awareness and understanding of regional challenges, threats, and opportunities,
      iv. Efforts in supporting the collection, management, and sharing of information,
v. The ability to coordinate NATO’s activities in the south, and
vi. Successes and challenges regarding reaching out to partners;

105. **States** that a report of the assessment findings will be sent directly to the PCSC at the next NATO summit in order to:
   a. Decide upon action regarding the results, and
   b. Consider the suggestion that at that summit the PCSC utilize the results to,
      i. Create specific goals for the Strategic Hub in Naples,
      ii. Discuss expanding the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and
      iii. Emphasizes that other relevant committees should consult on potential actions; and

106. **Encourages** NATO member countries to improve or initiate bilateral relations with strategic countries in NATO’s South through means such as but not limited to:
   a. Dialogue,
   b. Cooperation, and
   c. Supporting mutual efforts; and

107. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.