**35 th Annual Model NATO**

**Washington, D.C.**

**February 13th – 16th, 2020**

**2020 Final Communiqué**

**Be it hereby resolved that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:**

(NAC 1/A)

1. **Tasks** SAC-T to work with the Afghan Assessment Group to analyze the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, including the Afghan National Army and Police, in order to assess when withdrawal from Afghanistan is tenable, and to set a tentative goal for withdrawal, setting the criterion of analysis to be multifaceted, covering numerous areas including but not limited to:
	1. Internal and external security and corruption,
	2. The success of the training of the Afghan National Army and Police, and
	3. The current political stability of Afghanistan and the threat the the Taliban poses on democracy and the Afghan government;
2. **Creates** a four year, biannual planning and review process to ensure the effectiveness of programs within Afghanistan under the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) through:
	1. Extensive goal setting set to occur on Year 1 and Year 3, which shall act as a framework for reform and action within the specific program,
	2. Review of goals and outcomes is to occur on Year 2 and Year 4, which will act as a catalyst for adaptive and operationally viable strategic initiatives,
	3. Collaborating with the Afghan Security Force to provide training within Afghanistan and in specialized training centers across the Alliance, and
	4. Promoting deployment and training opportunities to all Allies to fulfill these requirements based on capabilities;
3. **Tasks** the Political Committee with determining indicators of withdrawal that would:
	1. Include how to measure the success of the mission in Afghanistan, which in turn will be used in the following summit, and
	2. Be submitted by 2023 to the NAC;
4. **Establishes** a NATO-Afghanistan 3-day summit in 2024 held in Berlin, Germany which would be focused on discussing and re-evaluating operational goals and outlined in clause 2 focusing on:
	1. The security and civil needs of the Afghan National Government and the Afghan National Police, involving:
		1. Human rights
		2. Protection of civilians, especially woman and children, and
		3. The fight against corruption,
	2. The standards that Afghanistan will need to meet to signal a sign for NATO action, involving:
		1. Withdrawal,
		2. Reinforcement, or
		3. Maintenance of the status quo,
	3. The possibility of an extension of the Resolute Support Mission after 2024,
	4. A resolution to open debate on the conflict-related humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, specifically including a resolution to open debate in the summit on the conflict-resolution:
		1. Healthcare,
		2. Education, and
		3. The environmental impact of future operations, and
	5. The regional and political stability of outside threats on the Afghan Government and Afghan citizens;
5. **Further endorses** the use of capacity building programs underneath the Enduring Partnership within Afghanistan’s civilian sector to:
	1. Support anti-corruption, stability, rule of law and good governance principles within every level of the Afghan government, with financial assistance from the Netherlands,
	2. Integrate public safety apparatus such as police and emergency services for the purpose of increasing resilience on a national level,
	3. Strengthen civil-military relations to maintain collective security within the country and the region,
	4. Strongly urge the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) that is supplied by all willing and able member states to send funds to combat corruption within the Afghanistan state and all its government structures while asking member states to increase their donations to the fund, and
	5. Increase domestic emergency preparedness measures;
6. **Urges** more transparency on the part of the United States in regards to peace talks with the Taliban by:
	1. Assigning a single non-US NATO Ambassador, who will be voted on by NATO member states, to represent the alliance in the process of negotiations between the United States, the Taliban, and the Afghan government, and to report back to the NAC,
	2. Suggesting that this Ambassador be present at such discussions as an observer to guarantee transparency,
	3. Calling upon this Ambassador to inform alliance members of the current progress of peace talks with the Taliban and to report to the NATO body, who will advise on the development of an action plan focused on sustainable peace, and
	4. Establishes that this ambassador have a term of 3 years, and a new ambassador be elected by the member states of NATO;
7. **Calls upon** the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and the International Republic Institute (IRI) and other non-governmental organizations dedicated to electoral reform to continue to support the institutionalization of nonpartisan, domestic election observation groups to monitor Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections into the future by:
	1. Furthering training and involvement of Afghan observers to monitor elections and levels of transparency across the state,
	2. Advising the implementation of elections in a regular, timely manner without delay or undue hindrance to ensure the smooth transition of power, and
	3. Counseling the inclusion of governments at a local and municipal level to create a more stable government due to the rural nature of Afghanistan’s people and advising on the availability of ballots to rural areas to ensure elections are accessible to all citizens;
8. **Offers** the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan security and training programs for the Afghan Armed Forces (AAF) under the Train Advise and Assist Command (TAAC) to provide increased security for elections, including:
	1. Security for election sites and routes to election sites,
	2. Training Afghan election observers to adequately respond to cyberattacks, and provide appropriate technology to build a basic cyber defense system, with this cyber initiative being the responsibility of Estonia and France with total transparency evident in relation to other NATO members,
	3. Continued counter terrorism operations with objectives aligned with the United Kingdom’s counter terrorism strategy (CONTEST), especially in accordiance with strategy relating to election security, along with the leadership from the United Kingdom itself, and
	4. Establishing law enforcement, and border security training to combat the crisis on the southern border, to be led by Italy;
9. **Tasks** the Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence (MW COE) located within Poljce, Slovenia to train and instruct Afghan security and police forces in mountain warfare, in all areas including but not limited to: capability development, education, and tactics to improve overall Afghan security; and
10. **Tasks** the Partnership and Cooperative Security Committee to work towards expanding NATO’s partnership with Afghanistan by:
	1. Increasing the security of the overseeing of humanitarian aid provided to the Afghan people if needed,
	2. Continuing its promotion of women, peace, and security as well as environmental awareness, and
	3. Implementing a co-trust fund between the World Banks Afghan Reconstruction Fund and the NATO Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund (ANA) to provide for developmental assistance through the means of the newly acquired and improved assets of the Afghan Security forces, and
	4. Providing support, protection, and the basic security infrastructure for international humanitarian aid organisations as well as environmental organisations.

(NAC 1/B)

1. **Recommends** a program titled Abandonment Aversion Action (AAA) contributed by all willing and able member countries for the prevention of deserters to terrorist organizations by:
	1. Developing a structure within the Afghan military to boost morale as a way to prevent desertion that is led by the Afhgan government,
	2. Installing a rotational system that would further prevent against military fatigue by allowing soldiers to remain closer to their homes,
	3. Supporting the military by improving technology such as existing communication platforms and regiment training by NATO forces led by Belgium,
	4. Developing progressive leadership techniques of generals and high ranking members of the military to ensure effective leadership and successful solidarity once NATO eventually pulls out from the region,
	5. Reviewing the effectiveness of the rotation system by:
		1. Yearly reviews of the percentages of desertion of Afghan soldiers, and
		2. Review of the progress and future of the entire program at the 2024 NATO-Afghanistan Summit in Berlin;
2. **Urges** for continued enhancement of hierarchical and secure intelligence cooperation with the Afghan Security Forces to address specific threats to Afghanistan’s security through the RSM once the AAA has proven to be initially successful as determined by the NAC, in order to:
	1. Ensure the most immediate and complete amount of approved intelligence products, to be agreed upon by NATO member states, to be provided to the Afghan National Army in a streamlined manner to defend against violent threats in Afghanistan by all willing and able member states,
	2. Provide initial and sustainment training on all intelligence disciplines that are critical to identifying, mitigating, and stopping the emerging threats throughout the country without jeopardizing classified methods or current and past sources,
	3. Implement an advisory mechanism that ensures the successful autonomous intelligence activity by the Afghan National Army, and
	4. Promote the existing exchange program of Afghan security forces in NATO countries and organize training at the NATO Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence as a mechanism of improving Afghanistan’s cyber defense capabilities;
3. **Encourages** the ongoing partnership between NATO the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) in addressing and enhancing cooperation with those willing and able regarding Afghanistan by:
	1. Initiating discussions to address the EU-migrant policy and NATO’s strategic policy in Afghanistan,
	2. Including a strategic analysis partnership with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee to ensure the prevention of terrorism in Afghanistan and abroad, and
	3. Recommending clean energy and environmental pr
	4. otections to Afghanistan, led by Canada;
4. **Tasks** the Committee on Emerging Security Challenges in creating a briefing to the NAC regarding the migration situation from Afghanistan, which will include such but not limited to the risks that migration from Afghanistan poses in destabilizing the Middle East and Europe such as:
	1. The movement of suspect terrorists, and
	2. Financial destabilization;
5. **Tasks** the military committee to create an advisory panel comprised of security experts who will serve as consultants for the development of secure intelligence and information sharing practices with the Afghan National Security Forces, which will;
	1. Meet on a yearly basis in Prague, Czech Republic, and
	2. Consult tri-annually with the AAA program.

(NAC Tasking Document)

1. **Tasks** the Partnerships and Cooperation Committee to consider cooperation for humanitarian aid and relief for those impacted by the natural disasters with:
	1. The Red Cross, the World Health Organization and other relevant humanitarian organizations,
	2. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism,
	3. EUROCORP,
	4. Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and other countries also impacted by the ongoing natural disasters,
	5. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and
	6. United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team;
2. **Tasks** the Political Affairs Committee with:
	1. Opening a dialogue with Russia regarding the Bulgarian-Russian collision so as to focus on civilian rescue operations and other relevant humanitarian cooperation with Russia,
	2. Drafting a press release to update the global community on NATO’s response to this developing crisis; and
	3. Responding to Russia, particularly concerning the collision of civilian vessels in the Bosphorus Strait, and
	4. Completing a gender-based analysis to ensure the equitable distribution of assets and resources in aid distribution, to be completed prior to the execution of this Directive; and
3. **Tasks** the Emerging Security Committee with overseeing the protection, security, and forced migrants from the natural disaster.

(MIL 3/A)

1. **Acknowledges** the countries requesting assistance, including but not limited to the following:
	1. Italy,
	2. Bulgaria,
	3. Albania,
	4. Romania,
	5. Greece, and
	6. Turkey;
2. **Deploys** both the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center Center (EADRCC) and the Disaster Assistance Response Force (DART), spearheaded by SACEUR, and the forces of member countries to aid in disaster relief efforts in affected areas where states have so requested it from willing and able member states with the assistance of;
	1. The multinational Heavy Airlift Wing for immediate delivery of humanitarian aid to those areas most in need, and
	2. NATO’s Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) to gather intelligence regarding the scope of the crisis;
3. **Acknowledges** the deployment of Turkish Naval Forces into the Bosporus Strait to provide aid, in communication with a Bulgarian consular official, to the collision between civilian Russian and Bulgarian vessels;

1. **Requests** the NAC to task:
	1. The Partnerships and Cooperation Committee to consider cooperation for humanitarian aid and relief for those impacted by the natural disasters with:
		1. The Red Cross, the World Health Organization and other relevant humanitarian organizations,
		2. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism,
		3. EUROCORP
		4. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and
		5. United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team,
	2. The Political Committee with opening a dialogue with Russia regarding the Bulgarian-Russian collision so as to focus on civilian rescue operations and other relevant humanitarian cooperation with Russia,
	3. The Political Committee with drafting press releases for the purpose of:
		1. Updating the global community on NATO’s response to this developing crisis; and
		2. Responding to Russia, particularly concerning the collision of civilian vessels in the Bosphorus strait,
	4. The Political Committee with the completion of a gender-based analysis to ensure the equitable distribution of assets and resources in aid distribution, to be completed prior to the execution of this Directive; and
2. **Deploys** the Very High Readiness Task Force to provide emergency support for the impacted countries with the assistance;
3. **Utilizes** financial resources for relevant relief projects at the discretion of the military committee from willing and able states.

(MIL 3/B)

1. **Requests** the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) to release a request for assistance, to be distributed to NATO allies, that outlines:
	1. A list of supplies, such as winter tents, clothes, field tents, temporary shelters, first aid kits, sleeping bags, blankets, etc, that can be used to address the homelessness following both earthquakes,
	2. A list of rescue supplies, such as headlamps, water drainage pumps, high capacity pumps, extension ladders, concrete chain saws, hydraulic breakers, rescue tools for lifting concrete, search cameras, hydraulic concrete tools, and what else countries in need, to help provide support for rescue teams,
	3. A list of food and water supplies and medical supplies to help aid those in crisis in the countries in question, and
	4. The need for financial assistance from willing and able allied countries, including but not limited to Luxembourg, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium;
2. **Further requests** the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) to coordinate aid responses and supplies, as well as reaching out to countries and organizations to provide aid, such as:
	1. Non-governmental organizations such as Doctors without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross to help provide medical and emergency aid to areas affected by the natural disasters,
	2. Other international organizations, such as:
		1. The European Union, specifically reaching out to the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, to help coordinate and provide humanitarian aid and support within countries affected,
		2. The United Nations, specifically asking the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service under the World Food Programme, to offer humanitarian aid and support, and
		3. The Arab League, specifically through coordinating disaster response regarding the tsunamis that also affected some of their member states, such as Lebanon and Egypt, and
	3. Non-allied countries near the regions affected, in order to help provide immediate emergency supplies and resources;
3. **Asks** the EADRCC to coordinate with the Very High Readiness Forces to address immediate humanitarian concerns and actions as quickly and effectively as possible;
4. **Asks** the Civil Emergency Planning Committee to provide a consultation that will:
	1. Focus on the efficiency of existing responses in the next coming days, especially regarding the delivery of food and water supplies to the area,
	2. Continue to work with the EADRCC to ensure that needs are met as quickly as possible,
	3. Discuss with allied countries about additional needs that might need to be met, as more information is learned about the crisis,
	4. Create a damage report to asses harms during the current crisis,
	5. States the aid and military support will be provided with advisement from the damage, resources, and available assets report regarding the provision of personnel and equipments as well as national and NATO assets, and
	6. A gender based analysis of the requirements and how they might affect the NATO response;
5. **Urges** the Allies to provide military aid based on their national providence capacities such as:
	1. Military equipments that can help the humanitarian crisis such as:
		1. Helicopters,
		2. Airplanes,
		3. Naval assets, and
		4. Drones,
	2. Military financial aid based on national providence capacities, and
	3. Military troops from the BENELUX based on their national providence capacities.

(MIL 3/C)

1. **Expands** Operation Sea Guardian in cooperation with the EU Operation Sophia with the advisement from the Partnership Committee by:
	1. Prioritizing Italy, Greece, and Turkey and additional countries affected by the crisis,
	2. Ensuring security through situational awareness,
	3. Expanding this operation with the EU by February 29, 2020,
	4. Inviting landlocked countries and countries with limited naval assets, to participate in trainings and deployments for these operations,
	5. Tasking SNMG2 to increase their alert level for a response to any humanitarian crisis that they may be valuable in assisting in, and
	6. Deploying Operation Sea Guardian and Sophia to the water bodies bordering the areas affected by the ongoing seismic activities in the Mediterranean;
2. **Asks** the NAC to task the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee to engage in increased dialogue with nations outlined in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, and the League of Arab States, especially with the member nations affected by the ongoing crisis with the purpose of assisting them by request;
3. **Requests** the NAC to provide advice on the geographic and operational priorities of the emergency response, specifically regarding:
	1. Operational capabilities of specific countries’ ability to handle disaster responses, and
	2. Regional capabilities, specifically in regards to regional environmental concerns and security concerns;
4. **Encourages** willing and able member countries to volunteer funds, resources, and aid, such as the deployment of field hospitals, and other supplies to the areas affected by the crisis for the long term, with the implementation of hospital emergency planning training programs, modeled after the training hosted in Bratislava, Slovakia in 2016 through the Sendai Framework for Natural Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, to be held in Vilnius, Lithuania, by May 1, 2020 at the latest with the additional cooperation from the Czech Republic and other willing member countries;
5. **Requests** the NATO Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC) to:
	1. Ensure the successful implementation of the infrastructure rebuilding process with regards to the crisis, and
	2. Look into the measures surrounding retrofitting buildings, especially skyscrapers, to make them earthquake resistant; and
6. **Requests** that a gender-based analysis be conducted prior to the execution of this Directive to inform it's implementation for a mission shorter than 3 months, the gender-based analysis can be conducted as part of the after action review.

(NPG 1/A)

1. **Requests** the NAC to task the Political Committee with suggested topics, regarding nuclear defense and deterrence with Russia, to address in regards to their topic of reviving the relationship with Russia;
2. **Suggests** that the Political Committee, after an information briefing with the Nuclear Planning Group, consider discussing the following topics for their solutions:
	1. Improving countermeasures against the trafficking of nuclear material,
	2. Joint semi-annual seminars and declarations on nuclear policy,
	3. The future of the New START Treaty past 2021,
	4. Increasing non-proliferation efforts of nuclear weapons produced globally as is the goal of the Nuclear Sharing Group, and
	5. Suggest revisiting the frequency of meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC),
3. **Recommends** that these topics be discussed through the medium of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC); and
4. **Maintains** its position that Russia’s cooperation and adherence to critical agreements on reciprocity is integral to forward progress on the issue.

(NPG 1/B)

1. **Preserves** nuclear armament in countries in NATO by ensuring NATO member states maintain sovereign control over their arms, subsequent to NATO purview, of all nuclear armament of countries in NATO, including but not limited to, stocks controlled by France, United Kingdom and the United States;
2. **Suggests** the North Atlantic Treaty Organization increase the number of inspections and maintenance frameworks of nuclear armaments located in NATO member states by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the member states themselves, as approved by NATO member states;
3. **Requests** that the Military Committee enhances nuclearair defense capability in NATO if they so wish for it by:
	1. Bringing forward the deployment of MIM-104 Patriot Defense systems to Eastern NATO members as collectively approved by member states, consistent with NATO defense policy as a protective measure,
	2. Further deploying short-range Avenger missile defense systems in NATO military units in case of crisis,
	3. Deploying the number of Terminal High Altitude Air Defense systems in NATO capital and strategic cities in willing and able Member States, and
	4. Calling on all willing and able NATO members to handle all maintenance costs and usage proportional to the number of deployment of defense systems to their respective countries, while emphasizing the nonviolent purpose for the establishment of these systems;
4. **Moves** towards enhanced interoperability of tactical nuclear capabilities in NATO by:
	1. Encouraging allied and willing member States to accept the transport of tactical nuclear capabilities in times of crisis,
	2. Increasing dialogue and communication between nuclear sector leads of respective member countries regarding the movement of any and all nuclear material and/or weaponry, as to prevent miscommunication and misallocation of nuclear material,
	3. Encouraging all willing and able Allies to participate in the SNOWCATS mission, and
	4. Ensuring transparency with Allies and relevant powers concerning NATO operations as taking place in the spirit of promoting and upholding democracy and non-violent solutions to tensions between powers;
5. **Ensures** transparency of NATO movements of defense capabilities by submitting a formal public communique to all member states and directly implicated powers as notification of collective efforts to fortify baltic defense capabilities, including:
	1. Increased preparation of air defense strategies in Europe and North America by the establishment of protocols and action plans,
	2. The preservation of existing platforms as strategic assets, and
	3. Future exercises involving tactical or intermediate weaponry, such as Able Archer;
6. **Encourages** member states to utilize the expertise of the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence (JCBRN) Centre of Excellence (CoE) in the Czech Republic, in accordance with the Military Committee, for the purpose of enhancing already existing NATO measures linked to nuclear strategy; and
7. **Commits** to ensuring environmental consideration is taken for the deployment and procurement of nuclear defense weapons under the purview of the Environmental Protection Working Group with the permission of the Military Committee and the Emerging Security and Challenges Committee.

(NPG 1/C)

1. **Encourages** the extensive use of Permissive Action Links by sovereign states possessing nuclear weapons in Europe;
2. **Creates** a conference between the NPG and relevant NATO advisory bodies, which will:
	1. Create guidelines to address the distribution, transportation, regulation, theft, misuse, modernization, and disposal of nuclear materials,
	2. Meet once a year, beginning in June 2020, in the NATO headquarters, and
	3. Send completed guidelines and implementation procedures to the NAC for approval at the next NATO Summit;
3. **Implements** a new review of the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) led by the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Centre of Excellence that will:
	1. Focus on the following:
		1. Encouraging the fundamental value of deterrence with an emphasis on the safety of people,
		2. Encourages the development of the position of the alliance in terms of credibility and capability,
		3. Assess the efficiency and successes of the DDPR in the dynamic nuclear climate of 2020, and
		4. Assess the preparedness of the DDPR to address future nuclear threats,
	2. Start in August 2020, and submit the result to NPG by December 2020, and
	3. Be funded by any willing and able member states;
4. **Performs** innovatively and collaboratively within the framework of the Joint Research Center (JRC) for the High Flux Reactor (HFR) by:
	1. Reopening the 2012-2015 HFR research program with aims to broaden NATO wide understanding of nuclear sciences,
	2. Inviting willing and able NATO members to participate and increase contributions to encourage to further multilateral collaboration on nuclear research,
	3. Considering the value of research into technologies such as space-based nuclear detonation detection,
	4. Exploring the nuclear engineering and design that would maximize structural and environmental safety in wake of natural disasters with the facility above and suggesting member states consult relevant experts regarding investment in their own research and adoption of nuclear assets that are more resistant to natural disasters, and
	5. Allowing all member states to have access to HFR research regardless of their financial contribution under the requirement that it will not be used for malicious purposes;
5. **Moves** to increase its capability to combat hybrid threats by establishing the Office of Anti-Hybrid Threats (OAT) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with the jurisdiction of investigating willing NATO member states for:
	1. Evidence of hybrid threats from foreign countries or violent non-state actors against nuclear installations, atomic research, or nuclear air defense weaponry,
	2. Further evidence of hybrid threats against sovereign NATO nations,
	3. Prescribing proper solutions for the sovereign NATO state to further fortify the victim to prevent future hybrid threats, and
	4. Bringing forward potential solutions in order for the NATO sovereign state to take action against the perpetrator;
6. **Enhances** cyber security capabilities of member states to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities by:
	1. Encouraging the sharing of expertise and information among willing member states in order to strengthen the alliance cyberdefense,
	2. Improving the cyber security systems of NATO member states, specifically regarding the safety of:
		1. Information and data of transportation of nuclear materials,
		2. Nuclear reactors,
		3. Holding sites for nuclear weapons, and
		4. Military hardware equipped with nuclear weapons or nuclear propulsion system,
	3. Cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to cooperate in developing safeguards protecting the IT infrastructure of nuclear devices,
	4. Recommending the continuation of joint exercises to train NATO members in defense of cyber security attacks, and
	5. Suggesting an increased use of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC); and
7. **Encourages** the vertical integration of cyber security and nuclear defense preparedness by tasking the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence with specifically incorporating member state policy strategies regarding cyber security of critical nuclear infrastructure by:
	1. Focusing efforts on the interoperability between air, land, sea, and cyber defenses of nuclear material within NATO member states,
	2. Incorporating of a NATO-reviewed procedure for handling hybrid threats aimed at nuclear assets,
	3. Emphasizing cyber security research in regards to nuclear cyber-attacks through the Center of Excellence in Tallinn and the NCIRC, and
	4. Opening communication with all allies in NATO regarding cyber security and Innovations.

(NPG 2/A)

1. **Requests** Member-States’ delegations attending the 2020 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to seek efficient and effective solutions on the issues of:
	1. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, material, and technology to sovereign nations as well as non-state violent actors,
	2. The continued talks of universal, gradual disarmament of nuclear-armed states while realizing the need to keep nuclear independence in the twenty-first century,
	3. The continued conversation of peaceful nuclear energy and the exploration of alternatives to dirty, inefficient, or dangerous nuclear reactors, and
	4. The operational readiness of nuclear weapons including but not limited to encouraging permissive action links for willing and able countries;
2. **Urges** all States who possess nuclear power and weapons to take steps towards ratifying the NPT by:
	1. Calling upon the United Nations to invite NATO observer states to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty Conference of 2020, and
	2. Encouraging potential avenues of discussion to prevent the purchase of nuclear material by non-state actors;
3. **Resolves** parties of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop legislation and policies to effectively combat the trafficking of nuclear material to adhere to Article I within their sovereign borders and prevent movement of nuclear arms and explosive capable material outside their borders with the intention of arming other countries by:
	1. Reaffirminglimitations concerning the spread of nuclear weaponry by nuclear powers, and
	2. Respecting the sovereignty of member states to continue to conduct foreign policy;
4. **Encourages** verification and transparency in the field of nuclear weaponry by inviting cooperation from the International Atomic Energy Agency with inspecting all signers and ratifiers of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, including:
	1. Encouraging the strengthening of the current verification and inspection regime and provide assistance to those NPT signatories that don’t currently allow full inspectors,
	2. Encouraging Article VI of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which states that nuclear-weapon States to put disarmament activities under “strict and effective international control”, and
	3. Supporting a mandate for the FMCT verification is proposed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
5. **Recommends** the expansion and enhancement of the NPT Article III verification regime:
	1. Calling for the IAEA to inspect non-party and signatory members to the NPT to establish consistent and accountable enforcement of the NPT regime globally,
	2. Requesting additional inspection agencies participate in the verification process by providing commentary, review, and supplement to IAEA inspection and verification reports, and
	3. Seeking to include reputable international environmental inspection agencies such as the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) to participate in inspections to provide commentary and review related to the environmental impacts of various facilities;
6. **Provide** the means for willing and able member states to pursue peaceful nuclear energy alternatives for Baltic, Balkan, and European allies, such as:
	1. Enhanced regulation on the construction and operation of nuclear power plants housed within member state grounds with the IAEA, and
	2. Through the IAEA’s safeguards system supports giving assurances on the non‐diversion of declared nuclear materials from peaceful activities and on the absence of undeclared nuclear 4 materials and activities in states that concluded regional or bilateral safeguards agreements with the IAEA,
	3. Through sale and construction of CANDO safe Uranium reactors that have a by-product of non-weapons grade plutonium, and
	4. Encourages already regulated and restricted NATO Uranium as fuel to provide a united NATO solution;
7. **Encourages** all willing Member States to participate in the International Luxembourg Forum on preventing nuclear catastrophe by sending experts and consultants to events organized by the Forum;
8. **Recognize** that any transition toward increasing the use of nuclear energy in Eastern Europe should take account of the current economic importance of allies domestic energy industries and implement an energy sharing program among willing NATO member states in regards to clean nuclear energy, specifically highlighting the smaller Balkan/Baltic nations;
9. **Implement** a waste management program for the disposal of byproducts of nuclear energy to all North Atlantic Treaty Organization Member-States that wish for it, that seeks to enforce the proper disposal of depleted uranium throughout their country by:
	1. Incorporating proven, efficient, and safe waste management programs that will allow for better terms of cooperation, and
	2. Pushing for increased research into more efficient, safer, and cleaner waste management of harmful nuclear byproducts;
10. **Encouraging** cleaner nuclear reactors that would limit the possibility of producing weapons-grade uranium or plutonium to all willing countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other states; and
11. **Calls for** nuclear research regarding:
	1. Infrastructure to ensure the safety and security of nuclear facilities,
	2. Nuclear crisis management,
	3. Education to understand the risks of nuclear weaponry and energy, and
	4. That nuclear facilities of willing and able member states comply with the Paris Climate Agreement.

(NPG 2/B - PRESS RELEASE)

We as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are looking forward to the upcoming 2020 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an United Nations (UN) treaty with the purpose of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. NATO is committed to arms control and non-proliferation, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain a nuclear alliance. We are recommitting to the NPT in light of the dynamic nuclear climate in 2020 and hope that the Review Conference will pursue greater negotiations and increasing signatories on the treaty.

NATO would like to see a review of the procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the enforcement of the NPT and strengthening the current verification and transparency measures as they are the overseeing body in these matters relating to the enforcement of the NPT. In addition, NATO would like to see greater specificity regarding some of the language in the treaty. NATO views the enforcement of the treaty as of utmost importance and wants to see increased language regarding the monitoring and security of nuclear materials that are a target of misuse and trafficking. In addition, NATO would like to pursue greater deterrence through the implementation of a clause in the NPT that would enable deterrence exercises and requests the United Nations to consider this action at the Review Conference.

NATO remains steadfast in its protection of Alliance members through strategic deterrence while pursuing Article 6 of the NPT. The Eastern Front of the Alliance to this day faces the potential threat of nuclear attack, and in order to maintain peace and security in the region, there must be a matching strategic deterrent to such threat. NATO calls upon the global community to identify and discuss these threats to the Eastern Front and contextualize this concern in the conversation surrounding proliferation, global denuclearization, and safe nuclear practices.

NATO would also like to promote the third pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, regarding the right of all parties to pursue the use, development, and implementation of safe nuclear energy. We as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization encourage cooperation among allies and advocates for the rights of all member states explicitly stated in Article IV with consideration of the nonproliferation obligations listed by the treaty. NATO emphasizes maintaining state sovereignty throughout the implementation of any and all recommendations stated here by NATO.

(ESC 1/A)

1. **Calls upon** all able and willing Allies to commit to defense mechanisms for protection and resilience for NATO allied satellites by:
	1. Opening a dialogue among NATO countries to gain a holistic understanding of sovereign state interests in the development of space program, and
	2. Contributing data relevant to satellite and debris monitoring to ensure collective security;
2. **Establishes** a dialogue for countries to train military forces in situations of satellite malfunctioning, including:
	1. Focusing research on satellite capacity to endure radiation onslaught from extraneous sources, and
	2. Recommending the establishment of formal military training exercises for crises of satellite downages and the consequences;
3. **Resolves** to create a public document outlining in-depth its strategy towards space that,
	1. Provides the Alliance with a clear path forward in the future, and
	2. Creates a measure of accountability and transparency for each country moving forward with domestic space programing;
4. **Recommends** the adoption of a Unified NATO Space Defense Policy, addressing:
	1. The attempted breach of a sovereign nations cyber network,
	2. The intimidation tactics conducted with anti-satellite weaponry,
	3. The use of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons against a member nation, and
	4. Uplink and downlink satellite jamming;
5. **Recommends** the creation of a NATO operated database to monitor the current state of space debris in orbit from destroyed satellites and other unnaturally occurring debris using established programs and technologies, including:
	1. The global space debris monitoring and removal market used as a step of an established solution to space debris with the election of personnel to lead the efforts on removal and monitoring,
	2. The LEGEND model that predicts future debris environments, and
	3. ORDEM 3.0 utilized to assess debris impact for spacecraft; and
6. **Suggests** the use of national policy and regulations to limit member state’s contribution to space debris.

(ESC 1/B)

1. **Requests** the adoption and employment of the WPS Act, in the creation of the SOCOE, that will contribute:
	1. Implementation of “Women, Peace, and Security,”
	2. Inclusion of equality of employment practices with regards to,
		1. LGBTQ+,
		2. Women,
		3. People of Colour, and
		4. All other visible minorities, and
		5. Securing the right to equal pay regardless of sex or gender identity; and
2. **Strongly suggests** the Military Committee adopt a Unified Framework for a common defense strategy in the domain of space;
3. **Stresses** the importance of international cooperation in the space domain based foremost on NATO cooperation, extending to third parties, including:
	1. A future forum to address security and pooling of resources to cement a NATO effort of protection for our spacecraft,
	2. An increase in the level of cooperation with other organizations such as the European Union especially the European Space Agency, and
	3. An emphasis on the importance of ensuring a diversified range of international partnerships with countries that have established space capacity as well as through third parties that have not yet built space capacity;
4. **Advocates for** the enhancement of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in relation to space by:
	1. Highlighting the need for the advancement of capabilities by,
		1. Recommending the development of Extremely High-frequency band processing by NATO members to improve the jamming resilience of communications satellites, and
		2. Further recommending continuing research by member state research into advanced reconnaissance capabilities in their satellites, such as advanced adaptive optics,
		3. Underlining the need to increase interoperability by,
			1. Assisting member states in developing their own satellites incorporating NATO STANAG 4606 capability with additional financial and technical assistance for states without the capability to do so,
			2. Requesting that states with NATO STANAG 4606 capability that has not yet implemented it into their satellites to do so in the future,
			3. Recommending that future NATO STANAG architectures be included as appropriate into satellite development, and
			4. Specifically highlighting the need for increased redundancy in satellite capabilities available for use by NATO, and
			5. Underscoring the need for a dual-track approach of meaningful dialogue on the basis of a strong deterrence and defence posture with Russia and China; and
5. **Requests** the collaboration between allies to ensure the security of telecommunication and imaging satellites by:
	1. Reaffirming national commitments to the Outer Space Treaty to mitigate the risk of an arms race in space,
	2. Helping national defense forces detect risks and emergencies, such as natural disasters, and
	3. Establishing a multilateral agreement in regards to a response in the case of non-kinetic weaponry being utilized against a NATO country; and
	4. Requests the adoption of Gender-Based Analysis plus (GBA+) program to verify the equality of opportunity.

(ESC 1/C)

1. **Confirms** Alliance’s commitment to all existing legal international instruments for a policy for space such as, but not limited to:
	1. 1967 Outer Space UN Treaty, and
	2. Articles IV and V of the North Atlantic Treaty while reasserting their application to all activities in space;
2. **Strongly suggests** the Military Committee adopt a Unified Framework for a common defense strategy in the domain of space;
3. **Recommends** the North Atlantic Council to modify Article 6 of The North Atlantic Treaty to be amended to state “[...] on the forces, vessels, aircraft*, or spacecraft,* of any of the Parties, [...];”
4. **Stresses** the importance of international cooperation in the space domain based foremost on NATO cooperation, extending to third parties, including:
	1. A future forum to address security and pooling of resources to cement a NATO effort of protection for our spacecraft,
	2. An increase in the level of cooperation with other organizations such as the European Union especially the European Space Agency, and
	3. An emphasis on the importance of ensuring a diversified range of international partnerships with countries that have established space capacity as well as through third parties that have not yet built space capacity; and
5. **Advocates for** the enhancement of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in relation to space by:
	1. Highlighting the need for the advancement of capabilities by,
		1. Recommending the development of Extremely High-frequency band processing by NATO members to improve the jamming resilience of communications satellites, and
		2. Further recommending continuing research by member state research into advanced reconnaissance capabilities in their satellites, such as advanced adaptive optics,
		3. Underlining the need to increase interoperability by,
			1. Assisting member states in developing their own satellites incorporating NATO STANAG 4606 capability with additional financial and technical assistance for states without the capability to do so,
			2. Requesting that states with NATO STANAG 4606 capability that has not yet implemented it into their satellites to do so in the future,
			3. Recommending that future NATO STANAG architectures be included as appropriate into satellite development, and
			4. Specifically highlighting the need for increased redundancy in satellite capabilities available for use by NATO, and
			5. Underscoring the need for a dual-track approach of meaningful dialogue on the basis of a strong deterrence and defence posture with countries that have aggressive ambitions in space as deemed by the NAC.

(ESC 2/A)

1. **Calls upon** NATO to expand crisis management exercises to include climate security-related implications;
2. **Strongly Suggests**  that NATO countries work towards the goal of creating a more eco-friendly NATO by including but not limited to:
	1. Encouraging NATO members to move towards a goal of carbon neutrality within the next ten years,
	2. Dialogue with allied states to engage with members committed to the current Green Defense Framework with the goal of expanding capabilities of NATO armed forces to adapt to climate adaption, and
	3. Advise Countries to work toward non-essential military vehicles becoming more fuel-efficient;
3. **Recommends** increasing its military presence in the Arctic in response to melting ice caps and increased military activity in the Arctic, including, but not limited to:
	1. An increase of the Icelandic Air Policing mission to 8 fighter aircraft per rotation,
	2. Increased NATO Arctic military exercises on the territory of all willing and able nations with territory in the Arctic Circle, and
	3. Utilizing the NATO Support and Procurement Agency to procure, by all willing and able Allies, NATO-wide icebreaker assets;
4. **Urges** NATO assistance to the southern front climate issues:
	1. Support for water security and drought relief in Northern Africa and the middle east,
	2. Recommends the extension of NATO Assistance for Fontex and the European Union’s rescues efforts in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas to include future developments with Climate displaced migrants,
	3. The construction of climate-resilient infrastructure to both affected member nations as well as neighboring nations determined to be prone to destabilizing by climate-induced events, and
	4. The commitment of NATO funds specifically allocated to assist in short term concerns of member nations;
5. **Requests** the establishment of natural infrastructure (such as but not limited to man-made wetlands, beach barriers, and man-made lakes) to improve agricultural issues and exacerbated climate disasters such as uncontrolled forest fires; and
6. **Requests** the adoption of Critical Analysis Plus (CBA+) program to verify the equality of opportunity through this policy, prior to its implementation.

(ESC - CRISIS)

1. **Calls for** all NATO Allies that are willing and able to implement the Emergency Protection of Refugees Action Plan (EPRAP) for the purpose of protecting the migrants displaced in the crisis with the intent to:
	1. Stabilize crisis-hit regions, maintain stability and security, and mitigate negative effects,
	2. Implement emergency assistance and humanitarian relief efforts,
	3. Rebuild vital infrastructure, particularly hospitals, airports, and roads,
	4. Reduce the need for relocation for displaced people, and
	5. Strengthen border control and increased surveillance;
2. **Commits** to international cooperation and partnerships vis-a-vis the crisis while implementing the EPRAP by:
	1. Requesting collaborative action from the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees), and
	2. Requesting to partner with the European Union and the existing European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) to monitor the movement of refugees from affected states into NATO-allied borders as well as the European Council of Refugees and Exiles;
3. **Creates** the NATO Emergency Migrant Rescue Operation (EMRO) under the EPRAP based off Dynamic Mercy in the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea to:
	1. Conduct search and rescue,
	2. Increase maritime security, and
	3. Help to strengthen border security;
4. **Accepts** the aid of allied states to provide resources that are willing and able to, including, but not limited to:
	1. The Sustainment of Migrants in Allied Countries,
	2. Financial or Relief Packages to Host Countries and areas affected by the crisis,
	3. Aiding in the Construction of Relocation centers, and
	4. Assist in the safe passage of migrants into Allied Countries;
5. **Offers** shared NATO military assets to willing and able member states to help with the monitoring the movement of aid and the flow of migrants by utilizing:
6. NATO ground forces to maintain security and control in affected crisis areas, including:
	1. Properly preparing target nations of migrant movement for their arrival, with a focus on:
		1. Having adequate food, water, and shelter resources to avoid further fatalities, and
		2. Specifying the geographic area of arrival, emphasizing transparency with domestic populations to avoid the dissemination of false information, and
	2. Disseminate and share current data regarding the movement of peoples,
7. Peace Corps used for relief and rescue missions in affected crisis areas,
8. NATO’s shared airlift capability for rapid transportation response to deliver urgent supplies and also evacuate affected crisis areas, and
9. NATO’s intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor the evolving and ongoing crisis;
10. **Requests** the adoption of Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) program to verify the equality of opportunity through this policy, prior to its implementation; and
11. **Recognizes** willing member states affected by the recent natural disasters sovereignty to accept cooperative efforts from Russia in the exclusive form of humanitarian aid within the Black Sea:
	1. Enforce transparency regarding all accepted aid from Russia,
	2. Reinforcing the borders that have been established in the Black Sea to ensure sovereign waters are not breached,
	3. Ensuring no Russian military assets to enter sovereign territory, including air, water, and land, of member states, and
	4. Member states have the option to request a moderating NATO member that would mediate relations between Russia and the member state requesting help.

(PCSC 1/A)

1. **Invites** India for a meeting to create a memorandum of understanding that will include representatives from NATO and India to take place in March of 2020 that will address shared areas of interest, such as:
	1. Projecting stability in Afghanistan through Resolute Support Mission,
	2. Protecting the lines of communications that go through the Indian Ocean,
	3. Strengthening maritime security, with operations in the Indian Ocean,
	4. Increasing the status of women and human rights, and
	5. Preventing human trafficking and illegal migration from India to the Mediterranean;
2. **Extends** an invitation to India for an India-NATO summit to take place at a location of India’s choosing in September, 2020 which will:
	1. Discuss ways to combat Salafi-jihadist terrorism by al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS),
	2. Suggest future joint military exercises in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean,
	3. Address human rights, and human trafficking,
	4. Discuss pollution, natural disasters, the climate, and
	5. Invites a representative of the European Union and Pakistan to join the summit;
3. **Extends** an invitation to discuss the potential creation of a NATO-India Ad-Hoc committee after the India-NATO summit in coordination with the North Atlantic Council with goals in mind such as but not limited to:
	1. Addressing security concerns that are common to both entities such as terrorism and piracy in the horn of Africa, and
	2. Increasing dialogue between India and NATO especially as it relates to human rights, democracy, and common security goals;
4. **Utilizes** the DEEP Framework to create the “Defence Education Enhancement Program for India” (DEEPI) in collaboration with the Military Committee that will:
	1. Utilize current bilateral agreements between NATO member states and India regarding security,
	2. Be implemented after the Summit on the willing and able basis of India,
	3. Be comprised of relevant and willing experts and participants as outlined in the DEEP framework,
	4. Utilize strategies found to be effective in archived military operations such as Operation Active Endeavour in order to limit security concerns surrounding NATO operations,
	5. Provide education regarding cyber and maritime security as deemed relevant and appropriate by the military committee,
	6. Open discussions on cyber security will include the implications of India’s 5G trials and space program, and
	7. Be remodeled as NATO’s relationship to India develops; and
5. **Requests** the military committee to invite India to participate in a maritime exercise with NATO in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean following the summit that will:
	1. Increase cooperation between India and NATO,
	2. Help curb illegal human trafficking,
	3. Fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean, and
	4. Be held after the India-NATO summit.

(PCSC 3/A)

1. **Defines** the South region for the purposes of this document to include the region across the Mediterranean and the MENA region, but also from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa;
2. **Requests** the North Atlantic Council to consider amending the Mediterranean Dialogue in order to,
	1. Allow for a call to assistance from partners within the Mediterranean Dialogue,
	2. Create a system of approval by the Partnership and Cooperative Security Committee assistance is requested, and
	3. More easily expand to more countries to increase cooperation;
3. **Utilizes** the NATO Strategic Southern Hub with goals such as but not limited to,
	1. Conducting recurrent systematic analysis of the perception of NATO in the MENA region to better inform whether and how NATO should go forward,
	2. Create liaisons between key private and governmental actors in the MENA region, such as but not limited to:
		1. US Central Command (CENTCOM),
		2. US Africa Command (AFRICOM),
		3. African Union, and
		4. European Union,
	3. Increasing practical information sharing and communication with personnel on the ground within the MENA region for the purpose of transparency,
	4. Discussion on the People’s Republic of China’s interests in AU countries, especially Djibouti (particularly in sensitive assets and infrastructure),
	5. Discussing potential Russian aggression in the South,
	6. Increasing communication with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative through biannual meetings hosted in the Southern Hub,
	7. Establishing the sharing of best practices of security techniques learned from successful tabled operations such as Active Endeavour, and
	8. Renewing the mandate of Operation Sea Guardian to include humanitarian crisis response with a specific focus on migration;
4. **Enhances** consultations at all levels and practical cooperation with the EU regarding:
	1. Measures to bolster resilience to hybrid threats, ranging from disinformation campaigns to acute crises,
	2. Cooperation between NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean,
	3. Exchange of information on cyber threats and the sharing of best practices on cyber security,
	4. Ensuring the coherence and complementarity of each other’s defense planning processes,
	5. Parallel and coordinated exercises, and
	6. Efforts to support the local capacities of partner countries in the sectors of security and defense, and
	7. The importance of respecting the dignity of human rights;
5. **Invites** members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to observe educational activities at NATO’s Defense Against Terrorism Center of Excellence in Ankara, Turkey to:
	1. Engage with countries where threats of terrorism may originate, and
	2. Share techniques and practices to deter terrorism in this region;
6. **Increases** cooperation with the Mediterranean Dialogue members on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with the goals of,
	1. Establishing greater situational awareness of potential threats in the Mediterranean in order to facilitate quick response to present and future crises, and
	2. Empowering states on both sides of the Mediterranean to participate in the security of the region; and
7. **Encourages** the active involvement of member countries in the undertaking of displaced persons by asking:
	1. Active NATO countries for,
		1. Support or aid to Turkey, Greece, and other directly affected states, and
		2. To take in displaced persons to ease the countries of Turkey and Greece, and
	2. NGOs for support and aid to ease the efforts of Turkey, Greece, and Italy.

(PCSC 3/B)

1. **Creates** the Mediterranean Security Summit (MSS) at NATO’s Hub for the South in Naples, Italy starting on September 1, 2020, that will:
	1. Invite, including but not limited to, the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), The Union for the Mediterranean, Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative,and
	2. Update those present at the Summit on current and future NATO plans for the Mediterranean;
2. **Sets** an agenda for the Mediterranean Summit in order to discuss:
3. Communication and cooperation between the NATO, the AU, the EU and other NATO partners regarding issues related to security objectives and threats in the Mediterranean basin,
4. Actions regarding the importance of human rights and trafficking and their protection in the Mediterranean using a Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) to ensure equality and respect for all persons,
5. Russian presence in the Mediterranean,
6. Spread of viral diseases and other health concerns that threaten security,
7. Methods of terrorism prevention in the Mediterranean and beyond,
8. The current refugee crisis in the region, and possible solutions
9. Energy security in the Mediterranean Region, and
10. Any issues that the body deems relevant;
11. **Allows** the option for future summits that would:
	1. Further discussion of the topics if the initial summit does not result in full discussion of the topics within the agenda,
	2. Allow for the inclusion of additional topics of discussion as they develop,
	3. Discuss the Increase in cooperation between the bodies included in the summit, and,
	4. Discuss any other unforeseen future issues;
12. **Establishes** a course of action for the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative to be created after the MSS in order to address the concerns brought up in the MSS in order to:
13. Continue working on solutions proposed and evolve them as needed,
14. Help deter illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and human trafficking,
15. Determine terrorism origination in the region and focus on security within those regions, and
16. Inform the annual Work Programme for the Mediterranean Dialogue; and
17. **Invites** representatives from the MSS to report at the next meeting of the Partnerships and Cooperative Security Council in order to follow up on agenda items mentioned in the MSS report,
	1. Participate in a rich menu of education, training and consultation events,
	2. Prepare together for future operations and missions by participating in exercises, training, and current NATO-led operations and missions, and
	3. Share insights on areas of common interest or concern through political consultations and unclassified intelligence-sharing.

(PCSC 4/A)

1. **Calls for** a communication channel between Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team in order to achieve goals such as but not limited to:
	1. Centralizing relief efforts,
	2. Conduct an analysis of the surge capacity of each member nation around the affected zones,
	3. Coordination of the surge of displaced persons so as to not overwhelm any individual member nation,
	4. Calls for the monitoring of potential aftershocks and other related natural disturbances in the region,
	5. Coordinate efficient methods of accumulation, deployment, and deliverance of assistance,
	6. Establish communication with the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) to start coordinating rescue missions, and
	7. Coordinate efforts, develop guidelines and best practices between the INSARAG and relevant national Urban Search and Rescue Task Force (USAR);
2. **Emphasizes** the dignity of the Human Person especially, but not limited to, displaced persons through:
	1. Using a Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) in all applicable areas to reduce the disproportionate suffering of those affected,
	2. Providing the basic human needs for displaced persons and internally displaced persons in affected countries through initiatives such as field kitchens, and
	3. Encouraging the use of social programs to assist disadvantaged populations;
3. **Coordinates** with the Red Cross, the World Health Organization, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to:
	1. Combat and contain the cholera outbreak in Turkey and in other countries,
	2. Improve information sharing of best practices on how to mitigate the spread of disease and other aspects of disaster relief associated with the migration influx,
	3. Establish field hospitals in areas with severe structural damage and injured persons, and
	4. Support the provision of potable water to cholera-affected communities to prevent further infection via contaminated water;
4. **Extends** an invitation for collaboration during the crisis to the European Union, and other EU bodies in order to:
	1. Deploy ground troops with Eurocorps to help provide support and protection,
	2. Provide clear lines of communication, avoid duplication, and most efficiently use resources, and
	3. Provide other relief as deemed appropriate by the relevant EU bodies;
5. **Calls** upon the Military Committee to collaborate with the EU Civil Protection Agency, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), and the EADRCC in order to transport personnel and emergency supplies from volunteer organizations approved by NATO to disaster regions quickly in order to:
6. Allow for emergency supplies donated from appropriate and relevant NGOs to reach affected areas immediately,
7. Ensure there is adequate, coordinated ground support for joint efforts between NATO and EU non-militants in affected areas,
8. Uses volunteers from relevant NGOs in order to assist citizens in their home state that helps these citizens stay in their home country,
9. Utilize resources and forces from any willing and able NATO Allies to address the crisis, including, but not limited to, field hospitals and medical expertise, and,
10. Monitor the allocation of resources to ensure that NATO military personnel and United States and Canadian assets do not enter Syria to avoid the misperception of the militarization of humanitarian aid while supporting humanitarian aid to Syria not sponsored by NATO; and
11. **Requests** all countries affected to cooperate with NATO’s response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in order to:
	1. Assure those nations affected most by the crisis that those nations surrounding the disaster zone remain in full support of current and future relief efforts,
	2. Calls for solidarity between states affected by the humanitarian crisis, and
	3. Consider this crisis as an opportunity to increase cooperation and solidarity.

(PCSC 4/B - PRESS RELEASE)

On the current crisis in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions:

The Partnership and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC) of NATO is deeply concerned with the recent developments and extends its condolences for the grim toll on human life. However, it must be stated that NATO is fully prepared to deal with this crisis. For the purpose of full transparency, the PCSC aims to continue its collaboration with the European Union, the United Nations, the Red Cross, the World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other relevant humanitarian organizations in order to provide aid to those countries affected. To most effectively execute these ambitions, NATO will communicate through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), in association with the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), in order to provide a central line of communication for their immediate rescue efforts across the affected regions.

The committee will reach out to affected nations to offer humanitarian aid during this trying time. We will work alongside the previously mentioned organizations with the intention of preserving the dignity of the human person and helping those disproportionately impacted. These priorities include managing refugees fleeing from this crisis, transporting necessary personnel, providing relief aid, and working for the best interests of refugees, and providing access to potable water. Additionally, we will work to grant necessary medical supplies and medical experts from the WHO in order to combat and contain the spread of cholera.

As well as addressing short-term urgent developments, it is equally important to adopt a long-term perspective to monitor any aftershocks and progress made by the response efforts.

Coordinating with other international bodies in this situation is essential for both the proper allocation of resources during this disaster and the continuation of an effective response. In this regard, NATO will strive to provide continued assistance for as long as resources are available and necessary.

NATO will continue to coordinate and monitor these relief efforts and is fully confident in these proposed plans. NATO thanks both NATO members and non-members for their assistance in this unfortunate event and is expecting the successful alleviation of the issues facing those affected by the crisis.

(POL 1/A)

1. **Calls for** a program to assist women and girls in places of conflict as chosen by the NAC, which will:
	1. Teach women self defense techniques to equip them with the skills necessary to respond to potential threats and attacks,
	2. Facilitate the inclusion of women in peacekeeping operations and reconstruction in regions in conflict, and
	3. Create more accessibility for women and children to acquire medical products,
		1. NATO-lead community outreach program to assist the women and children in conflict stricken areas, and
		2. Relief support missions to promote the health and wellbeing of women affected by conflict;
2. **Encourages** the protection for children in conflict-stricken areas by:
	1. Establishing a system of protection directed towards orphaned and undocumented youth,
	2. Creating a training program for military members on ensuring child safety in theater,
	3. Protecting against the potential of violence and sex-trafficking of minors and children; and
3. **Establishes** the creation of media campaign, which will:
	1. Increase gender promotion in the media to raise awareness for women in military and security fields,
	2. Feature awareness of gender inclusivity in NATO military and leadership roles, in order to encourage women in all operations of the military,
	3. Reflect the general experiences of women in NATO,
	4. Promoting cadet programs to encourage young girls to join the military,
	5. Include awareness of young women and girls and the effect conflict has on them, and
	6. Promote awareness of gender, sexual identities, cultural and cultural awareness in conflict areas.

(POL 1/B)

1. **Calls upon** the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective (NCGP) to:
	1. Expand the role and work of the General Advisors (GENAD) in the planning, execution and evaluation of gender policy within the NATO framework,
	2. Strengthen the work done by the Gender Field Advisors (GFA) in conducting gender analysis on NATO operations,
	3. Integrate Gender Focal Points (GFP), an existing NATO approved mechanism, within deployed units on NATO missions that focuses on integrating gender perspectives,
	4. Work with the Civil Society Advisory Panel (CSAP) to identify areas of potential engagement between NATO and civil society organizations focused on women in peace and security,
	5. Task the CSAP with the creation of a Program for the Cultural Education of Gender Advisers (PCGA), which will,
		1. Provide cultural awareness training, and
		2. Educate Gender Advisers concerning the perspectives on women of other cultures and working effectively;
2. **Creates** the NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Task Force in the IMS Office of the Gender Advisor in order to report, monitor, educate on, and respond to cases of sexual exploitation, harassment, and abuse occurring amongst NATO members of any gender, which will:
	1. Contain a reporting panel which will:
		1. Have standardized medical evaluation procedures in place for individuals who wish to report an instance of sexual assault, and
		2. Create a reporting panel for cases of sexual misconduct which will be comprised of unbiased outside personnel in order to reduce fears of retaliation, with the report being completed by an outside investigative agency,
	2. Supplements the women, peace, and security task force by creating clear and consistent punishments for offenders, including penalties, fines, and being relieved from duty; and
3. **Establishes** preliminary guidelines for the reporting of sexual misconduct to the SEA Task Force which states:
	1. Reports taken will be kept confidential,
	2. Any information given will be released with the knowledge and consent of the reporting party,
	3. Appropriate action will be taken to protect reporting parties and witnesses, and
	4. Encourages women to come forward about any possible mental trauma due to sexual assault and violence;
4. **Establishes** the Committee for the Enhancement of National Action Plans (E-NAPs) in order to:
	1. Support NATO members’ existing National Action Plans,
	2. Compile and disseminate information regarding the best practices from the different NAPs, and
	3. Review whether NATO states are working towards their NAPs or if further progress is needed;
5. **Expands** the NATO Mentoring Program for Women by:
	1. Establishing the training to increase the numbers of current women mentors,
	2. Creating a comprehensive program which takes into account the experiences and preferences of women in NATO who wish to advance into leadership roles and works to pair those women with current women leaders within NATO's framework, including the military,
	3. Focusing on the success of awareness campaigns in educating all military personnel on the potential impact experienced by victims of conflict, and
	4. Creating a conference for women’s mentoring, the Mentoring Women in NATO Conference, which will create opportunities and pathways for women to meet other women who are in positions of leadership, military, combat, and other roles;
6. **Encourages** the inclusion of education specifically regarding the unique forms of discrimination and abuse regarding personnel and staff facing gender and sexuality discrimination;
7. **Recommends** the implementation of programs to facilitate the combination of work and parenting in the military forces that would:
	1. Applying a comprehensive support system for women and men before a combat mission,
	2. Advance education in combat training for troops in non-combat roles who operate in hostile or conflict intensive areas in an effort to mitigate PTSD, and
	3. Providing follow up assessments of non-combatant troops, specifically for women after experiencing conflict; and

(POL Crisis - PRESS RELEASE)

In the past 24 hours, the world has been faced with a devastating global tragedy impacting human security and safety. NATO has been responding immediately to the crisis, focusing on humanitarian efforts and aid first and foremost. NATO has been working with international organizations in order to coordinate a prompt humanitarian response to all states impacted by the tragedies.

The earthquakes occurring in both Turkey and Romania are of grave concern to the global community, and at this time NATO is focusing its’ efforts on humanitarian aid to those civilians affected by this natural disaster. At this current time, Turkey has had to move displaced persons from this area into other sectors of Europe in order to focus on restructuring and securing the areas devastated. Turkey is devastated by the loss of life in this tragic event, and is looking forward to re-establishing a sense of safety within its borders; focusing on economic, infrastructural, and social efforts to achieve that sense of security. Turkey encourages the assistance of other members of NATO to aid in the relocation of displaced persons.

The collision within the Bosphorus Strait has threatened the lives of thousands of civilians amongst NATO countries. The risks to human security necessitates an immediate response to mitigate the situation. At this time, it is essential for NATO to collaborate to reach a prompt humanitarian response. NATO is coordinating efforts between affected member states including Bulgaria in regards to the rescue of the civilian vessels. This is through civilian, not military, cooperation with Russia through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

Member states will coordinate efforts to ensure an efficient and well rounded support operations. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is open to facilitating dialogue between Russia and Bulgaria as well as moving towards pragmatic solutions benefiting those states impacted. Information will be provided as other NATO committees create initiatives addressing this situation.

NATO will provide further updates as the situation evolves, and supports any efforts by non-governmental organizations to provide aid during this crucial time.

(POL - CRISIS)

1. **Requests** that the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) convene immediately on the matter of the Bulgaria-Russia civilian collision to:
	1. Discuss the offer of civilian Russian aid to relevant parties,
	2. Negotiate the response to the situation of Bulgarian-Russian civilian collisions, including the assurance of the non-militarization of troops responding to the situation,
	3. Request and coordinate an international investigation of the incident from the appropriate international bodies,
	4. Take into consideration the potential for military miscommunications and escalations, and
	5. Take into consideration the potential of cyber security threats that may rise to the level of military aggression;
2. **States** that militarized relief efforts by non-NATO members or non-partners will not be accepted by this body;
3. **Requests** the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) to coordinate search and rescue of persons involved in the Bulgaria and Russian civilian ship collision with the help of other international organizations such as the European Commission’s European Disaster Risk Management Operations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE);
4. **Recommends** the further use of Centers of Excellence, such as the Crisis Management and Disaster Response (CMDR) COE in Sofia, Bulgaria, to aid our fellow NATO member countries, as well as non-member countries, that have been affected by this crisis; and
5. **Reaffirms** the commitment to the dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue in its relationships with Russia.

 DRAFT: MC Crisis/A

COMMITTEE : Military Committee

TOPIC: Crisis

SPONSORS: Lithuania, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Albania, Denmark, Norway, Turkey, France, Germany, Hungary, Spain, United Kingdom, the United States of America, Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, Canada

SIGNATORIES:

**The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization hereby recommends the following policy recommendations:**

**General Guidelines**

The military committee recommends to SACEUR that military police forces from willing and able member nations be deployed to areas of need in Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania. We would like to emphasize that the forces be deployed at the discretion of the host nation to combat the situations which they deem to be in need of help. Further, we stress that the deployment and exit strategy of external forces be coordinated by the host nation with SACEUR. The host nation’s discretion extends to the ministry or governmental branch to which the supporting forces will respond such as the Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry in Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania.

Our primary policy goal for these forces is to create a command structure in which the host nation has authority, and the contributing nations have clear direction regarding to whom they report. Foreign military police must fall under the command of the local military police structure in all aspects. We also recommend that any foreign commanders on the soil of an affected nation regularly meet with the appointed head of the local military police to streamline efforts and increase cooperation and transparency.

**Creation of a New Mission**

We suggest the creation of a mission to operate in the crisis by helping these countries' governments provide effective security for their citizens, by providing mentoring and support to these forces if desired. We also suggest this mission partner with the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence to assist the civilian police forces with security as well as access and distribution of assets. Lastly, we encourage partnering with the local police forces to assist upholding security and safety for those directly affected by the crisis. It would be advisable that this mission also provide logistical support for the mission to operate successfully in the countries in need. This mission will be working in support and alignment of led by the greater coalition of the United States of America.

**Using Available and Existing Resources**

In addition to this, we believe that it is critical to assess the available resources that exist and ensure that resources and assets are being used as efficiently as possible. Such forces include but are not limited to Poland’s Special Forces, KFOR in the Balkans, and the Hungarian Defense Forces (some of which are already stationed in Kosovo and Bosnia). These forces can be moved around to provide additional support to countries in need. Such resources as financial from willing countries. Romania and the United States also should work to withdraw forces from existing NATO collaborative training operations to redirect those same forces to the crisis zone.

We advise consultation with existing NATO Centers of Excellence for assistance regarding operations from such centers as the ones for Counter-Intelligence, Crisis Management and Disaster Response, Military Medicine, Military Police, Security Force Operations, and Stability Policing.

We would also like to emphasize the need for a specified avenue for the transportation and material supply for both the local forces and the assisting nations.

We also recommend allocating supply assets and units able to provide logistic support in capabilities available between Allies. In the first phase of the operation landing zones should be created in the countries of need and logistic lines between Allies participating.

The coalition of Poland, Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia will be in command of the logistic. The support operation should be coordinated under the mandate of NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) under the command of SACEUR. Aviation assets from Latvia, Hungary and Poland will be provided for Allies which need to move their forces immediately and do not have necessary capacities. Poland offers special SOFT Unit NIL and cargo Hercules flight. Latvia will provide helicopters and advisory forces.

**Exit Plan**

We would advise for a specified exit plan to be put in place prior to deploying any forces. This will avoid contention when the forces are no longer needed. This will be at the discretion of the host nation. The body maintains that the host nation retains the sovereignty to dismiss supporting forces at their discretion.

**Western Coalition**

This committee suggests that SACUER recommend to BENELUX that they create a military police coalition to be available to go and help regain control in problematic areas to the countries willing and in need of aid. This force would be formed of The Maréchaussée royale, the Military police group and the Police Luxembourgeoise. The cost related to this deployment will be assumed by Luxembourg.

 Also, the committee is advising the SACUER to create a great coalition with The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, The Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway and Germany which offers heavy air capabilities, Civil protection training, Naval Assets Contribution, Financial Contribution, Military experts, Civilian experts, and medical assistance. In addition, we suggest the coalition should be deployed in the countries of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania on request of the nations in question in coordination with the paramilitary troops provided by willing and able member nations. The coalition should also be able to be deployed in other nations affected by the crisis on request of the nation in question in the scope they desire.

Given the long and storied histories of the federal paramilitary police forces, we suggest a follperation with a single, overarching headquarters that will coordinate between them. This headquarters will also ensure coordination between the US-led coalition and this paramilitary police response force: from Italy, the Carabinieri; from France, the Gendarmerie; from Czech Republic, the Military Police Corp; from Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; from France, the Gendarmerie; from Germany, the Bundespolizei; from the Czech Republic, the Military Police Corps; and from Lithuania, the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, allowing nations to commit to deploying the below-specified assets to designated areas of

**Partnerships with European Union**

 This committee also asks that the NAC partner with the European Union to cooperate with the Civil Police for the European Union (CEPS), the EUROGENFORCES, and the EUROCORPS. Specifically, because European Union member states are being affected by these disasters and the lack of police forces, we believe that it is critical to coordinate efforts and utilize the resources and groups that already exist to aid the countries in need. Especially to avoid duplication of structures.

**Need Among Nations**

Turkey, having established martial law in some city centers, does not wish to receive NATO aid in the form of military police, and states that they can handle any potential unrest due to the crisis as a domestic issue. Turkey is willing to assist neighboring countries when able.

Greece asks that NATO create a support mission to provide a limited amount of military police to aid our own forces in controlling the unlawful activity taking place. We suggest that these troops be from the BENELUX coalition, as the movement of those troops is paid for by Luxembourg, and Greece is unable to provide financial aid to assist with the movement of military police.

As stated above the nations of Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania are interested in recieving aid by military police with the guidelines above in place.

 We recommend that this operation will be conducted giving due consideration to matters of gender.